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Abstract 
Motivated by the centrality measures constructed in Larcker, So and Wang 
(2013), I affirm that board connectedness positively affect firm performance in 
Singapore, and even if we were to measure firm performance by Tobin's Q. The 
impact on firm performance persists over at least four years. Controlling for 
Corporate Governance using a proprietary database, the Singapore Corporate 
Governance Index, only the Eigenvector centrality under simple-weighted and 
hyperbolic-weighted projections survives the robustness test, suggesting that firstly, 
the local proxy of Corporate Governance based on OECD principles possibly 
controls for what is proxied by the Betweenness, Closeness and Degree centrality 
measures, and secondly, there is a strong case not to ignore multiple ties when 
projecting interlocking boards. The jury is hung on which weighting method is 
superior – the hyperbolic weighted projection has stronger results for return-on-
assets while the simple weighted method has stronger results for Tobin's Q. These 
results collectively provide additional support that some Corporate Governance 
indices may already impute the effects of connected boards to a certain extent.  
Using the methods for measuring social networks in interlocking boards as a 
basis, I extend the methodology to the space of ownership networks, a new 
endeavor since it considers the network distribution and connectedness of firm 
ownership, rather than focusing solely on the ultimate owners as has been the norm 
in the existing literature. Contrary to initial expectations, I find that simple methods, 
disregarding the directedness of the ownership linkages, are sufficient to yield 
 strong results. This paper is the first to document that ownership centrality has a 
direct impact on corporate performance. Controlling for Corporate Governance 
using the Singapore Corporate Governance Index, I find that the results for Tobin's 
Q are fully explained away. However, the results for return-on-assets remain mostly 
undiluted, with Degree and Eigenvector more significant for the unity-weighted 
network, and Betweenness and Closeness more significant for the stake-weighted 
network, making the N-score composite centrality measure a suitable compromise. 
Composite centrality shows significant influence on firm return-on-assets in the 
short to medium term. 
 
Keywords: Social Network, Ownership Centrality, Corporate Ownership, 
Board Centrality, Interlocking Directorates, Corporate Governance, Singapore 
Corporate Governance Index, SGX, Singapore 
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Introduction 
This dissertation investigates the effects of social linkages that span the 
corporate networks jungle. Herein, I attempt to dissect the qualitative nature of the 
web of social networks structures across firms in a quantitatively rigorous manner 
using a consistent diagnostic framework. I extensively apply specific measures 
originating from graph and network theory, known as the centrality scores, and 
uncover their corresponding effects on firms. This study uses the stocks listed in 
Singapore as a basis, and from the data of these firms, two distinct sets of networks 
for closer analysis were constructed.  
The first part explores the effects of interlocking boardroom directorates, adding 
to the current literature by looking at the longer-term effects of board network ties. 
Studying the system as a bipartite network, I suggest that the traditional method of 
analysis is leaving out important information in transposing the network using Flat 
(unweighted) projections. I augment current studies by looking at how the well-
studied framework of Corporate Governance overlaps with boardroom centralities. 
The second part applies the methodology developed earlier on the network 
formed by firm owners, in a unique study of ownership centralities. Initially, the 
idea was to use more sophisticated network measures in dissecting the weighted 
and directed network of ownership links, but surprisingly, it turns out simple 
methods are sufficient to yield concrete robust results, proving among other things 
that the directionality of ownership is not vital in harvesting useful conclusions from 
the ownership network.  
As in the proverbial story of the blind men and elephant, in this paper the two 
parts are like what two different blind men feel when they examine different body 
parts of the elephant – the nebulous ball of intricate relationships and linkages in 
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the corporate network setting of firms listed on the Singapore Exchange is the 
elephant in the room. This dissertation attempts to put together two different views 
of the same elephant so that we can understand better the topology of social 
networks formed by firms and the impact these networks have on them. 
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Part 1.    How many Ties that Bind – A Treatise on Connected Boards  
Stripping away the extraneous flourishes, the primary thrust of this dissertation 
is the novel study on ownership centrality – to test the ways we can apply what we 
know about graph theory and network theory to capture the relationship between 
the firm and its shareholders concisely and succinctly. To do this for the United 
States would be challenging simply because of the enormity of the market - the 
ownership web can grow complicated very quickly.  Hence, I commenced the 
research on a smaller scale, starting with Singapore1.  Some would question if 
Singapore is a reliable test bed, especially in term of recent developments in 
network centrality.  To assuage this concern, I will start by replicating past results 
of Board Centrality in the Singapore market. Hopefully, the results of the 
applicability of board centrality on firm performance would go some way in 
mitigating the apprehension of some skeptics in accepting that Singapore is a useful 
and relevant test case for testing the empirical relevance of ownership centrality. 
Chapter 1.1    Literature Review 
1.1.1    Board Connectedness 
Besides a film, a play, and a song, the phrase “six degrees of separation” also 
inspired the formulation of the small world problem, which posits that all humans 
are connected to one another via six or fewer friends. This is probably the best 
known social network academic urban legend often attributable to social 
psychologist Stanley Milgram (Travers and Milgram (1967)). Since then, 
Sociologists, Economists, and researchers in Management, Accounting and 
                                                
1 Takes and Heemskerk (2016) found extremely similar board network topologies between 
countries, yet large differences when it comes to the relation between economic prominence 
indicators and firm centrality. In terms of centrality dominance, Singapore ranked 16 out of the 34 
national networks studied, very near the median. 
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Corporate Finance have been studying fervently the impact of social networks on 
resource allocation, political influence, capital markets, Corporate Finance policies 
(Fracassi (2016)), labor markets (Chua (2011)), and firm performance. 
In Corporate Finance, the common research focus is that of the interlocking 
boards, also known as connected boards or shared board directorates. The earliest 
papers tend to investigate how interlocking boards affect executive compensation 
and turnover (Hallock (1997), Fich and White (2003)), explore the theoretical 
reasons for this phenomenon (Fich and White (2005)) and the agency theory 
implications (Hillman and Dalziel (2003), Hallock (1999)).  
This empirical paper builds on the strand of literature in Accounting and 
Corporate Finance that explores the effects of interlocking boards on firm 
performance. Larcker, et al. (2013) has shown that firms with central boards of 
directors earn superior risk-adjusted stock returns, better return-on-assets growth, 
and more positive analyst forecast errors. Their paper is one of the first papers that 
invoked centrality concepts from graph theory in the Corporate Finance literature 
space.  Intuitively, high network centrality could proxy for the ability to effectively 
garner and harness private or timely information, expertise, new practices, and 
favors to create value for and manage risks of the firm. The result of Larcker, et al. 
(2013) is supported by evidence from the Netherlands (Feyen (2015)), but not in 
Italy (Croci and Grassi (2012)). Hence, as far as empirical evidence could suggest, 
it is not clear ex-ante whether firms with high boardroom centrality would have 
superior firm performance in Singapore.  
On the theoretical front, it is also unclear whether we should predict a 
relationship between high board connectedness and better firm performance. The 
vast literature in sociology, economics, and finance acknowledges that there are 
5 
 
both pros and cons to being highly central in a network. The plausible benefits of 
highly central boards can come from several channels. First and foremost, highly 
connected boards have access to more and better information, be it macroeconomic 
outlooks, idiosyncratic firm risks, industry trends, general market conditions, 
impending regulatory changes, or insider information. Better and timely access to 
information is crucial in formulating strategic decision and responses in the 
boardroom (Mizruchi (1996)). Better access to information would entail better 
access to innovations through the network, which will allow a highly central board 
to be an earlier beneficiary as far as diffusion of innovations and new practices are 
concerned (Shropshire (2010), Omer, Shelley and Tice (2016)). Innovations would 
include patents, governance best practices, new technologies, innovative financing 
schemes and compensation structures (Pennings (1980), Faleye, Kovacs and 
Venkateswaran (2014)). Adams and Ferreira (2007) go to the extent of suggesting 
that having a friendly board is an optimal choice for the firm, by enabling the board 
to strategize with management using their collective pool of knowledge and 
network. Second, highly central boards have better access to resources that may 
engender lower costs or enable economies of scale (Mol (2001)). Ties between 
borrower and lender result in larger loan amounts, lower interest rates, and less 
restrictive covenants (Engelberg, Gao and Parsons (2012)). More central boards 
enjoy lower bond yield spreads, and this advantage could conceivably translate into 
better firm performance (Chuluun, Prevost and Puthenpurackal (2014)). Third, 
social contacts of highly central boards will facilitate the search for new CEOs and 
directors (Engelberg, Gao and Parsons (2013)2), and strengthen ties with current or 
                                                
2 One of the earliest research on social networks in Corporate Finance by Engelberg, et al. (2013) 
mapped out various social linkages and found that an additional connection to an outside executive 
or director increases compensation by about $17,000 on average.  They argued that this dimension 
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potential suppliers or customers (Hillman and Dalziel (2003)), or even facilitate 
more efficient mergers and acquisitions (Renneboog and Zhao (2014)). Fourth, 
highly central boards may be more powerful monitors who can veto management 
projects that do not enhance firm value (Kroszner and Strahan (2001), Hermalin 
and Weisbach (1998)). Fifth, firms that have political embeddedness in the 
boardroom reduce uncertainties and increase opportunities (Haveman, Jia, Shi and 
Wang (2017)) while also increasing shareholder value (Faccio (2006)) and 
increasing the chance of bailouts compared to unconnected firms (Faccio, Masulis 
and McConnell (2006)) 
On the flip-side, there are compelling reasons why high board centrality might 
be harmful to firm performance. First, highly central boards would be more 
susceptible to the spread of disinformation and ostensibly good innovations that 
might cause ruin in the medium to long term (Snyder, Priem and Levitas (2009), 
Connelly and Gangloff (2012)). One example is the dubious practice of options 
backdating, whose legitimacy seemed to be enhanced through boardroom interlocks 
(Bizjak, Lemmon and Whitby (2009), Brass, Butterfield and Skaggs (1998)). 
Second, firms with highly central CEOs may engage in empire-building and 
entrenchment practices at the expense of firm value. El-Khatib, Fogel and Jandik 
(2015) found that higher CEO centrality is detrimental for corporate outcomes, in 
this case, the erosion of value in the acquiring firm and combined entity in the 
highly connected CEO’s more rampant pursuit of mergers and acquisitions. Highly 
central CEOs are not immune to abusing their power and influence to increase 
entrenchment and reap private benefits at the firm’s expense, such as extracting 
                                                
is not captured by extant corporate governance measures and that this is evidence that there is an 
efficient contracting explanation for CEO pay. 
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higher compensation from the firm (Brown, Gao, Lee, Stathopoulos and House 
(2009), Hwang and Kim (2009)), or appointing friends and sycophants as directors, 
thereby weakening board monitoring and neutering the purpose of independent 
board members (Fracassi and Tate (2012), Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2012)). 
Third, the highly central director may be a more effective decision maker, but 
limited bandwidth coupled with multiple directorships, a situation in firms known 
as “busy boards”, has been shown in multiple studies to be detrimental to firm 
performance (Fich and Shivdasani (2006), Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999), 
Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2008)). 
On the flip-side of the flip-side, even though multiple directorships have been 
unequivocally frowned upon by the mainstream academia, evidence has been 
unearthed that there are certain situations when a busy board setup is beneficial. 
One such example by Field, Lowry and Mkrtchyan (2013) is the case of the IPO 
firm. The busy board conundrum is mentioned here as a useful analogy to the 
problems plaguing entities with high centralities; the busy board puzzle parallels 
the high centrality paradox.  To understand busy boards, we need to recognize that 
Board serves both monitoring and advisory functions, and depending on the firm 
life cycle a busy board may or may not be favorable. Is there a high centrality 
paradox, where high centrality confers power, but absolute power has a tendency to 
corrupt? 
The other complication on the theoretical front is that social networks are 
inherently complicated, a relationship may not necessarily increase communication 
and sharing. It is conceivable that increased contacts that board membership 
facilitates may cause some professional friendships to degenerate into hostile 
animosity, and the framework we construct does not allow for such nuanced 
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interpretations. Every linkage we assume in our model is a positive link, whereas 
in reality, it may also indicate indifference, and or a less benign linkage involving 
backstabbing or dramatic politicking by frenemies.  
In this paper, the network is restricted by the observable formal ties between 
firms formed by interlocking directors. We do not observe any social ties, nor other 
professional ties formed by shared work experience, nor any alumni ties to 
educational institutions. Our horizon of observation is also restricted to the set of 
boards of firms listed in Singapore. This is a problem inherent in all research 
involving social networks – it is impossible to capture the complete set of 
relationships between human agents, and studies that purport or attempt to do so 
may commit the opposite sin of over-reporting. For example, some studies assume 
a tie when two individuals study in the same education institution in an overlapping 
timespan. Personal anecdotal experience suggests that there are far more false 
positives under such a classification scheme than should be assumed. Encouraging 
results from some studies (Hwang and Kim (2009), Westphal, Boivie, Chng and 
Han (2006)) show that formal ties and informal ties are correlated and 
complementary, so in analyzing the most formalized ties in terms of boardroom 
membership I hope to also capture the impact of informal ties on firm performance. 
Furthermore, compared to other studies using hand-collected proprietary data, the 
S&P Capital IQ database used would be more reliable and could be more easily 
cross-verified. 
Recent Corporate Finance papers that study the centrality of interlocking boards 
approach it from two different lenses. Most of the existing literature focuses on 
director interlocks and calculating the centralities of the directors (Feyen (2013), 
Omer, Shelley and Tice (2014)), including the CEO (El-Khatib, et al. (2015)). The 
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firm centrality is then valued as an aggregated metric of the directors (Ang, Owen 
and Suchard (2017)) or used to compute some derivative measure (Hong (2015)). 
The other way to calculate this firm characteristic is to compute the firm centrality 
directly as a bipartite projection of the network of interlocking boards on its boards 
(Larcker, et al. (2013), Feyen (2013)). The latter is the approach this paper adopts. 
Feyen (2013) employs board data in the Netherlands to disentangle two 
ostensibly different effects, that of interlocking board centrality and director 
centrality.  Using the eigenvector centrality measure as the key measure, he found 
that high interlocking board centrality is beneficial for the firm, whereas firms with 
high director centrality had inferior stock returns. Moreover, he found that interlock 
ties only affect returns when they are active and that the access to value-enhancing 
resources decays rapidly after the dissolution of these ties. Unlike interlocking 
board directorates, the relevance of ties persists long after directors leave a board.  
This persistence effect is congruent with results by Gray and Nowland (2013) who, 
using data from Australia, found that both the breadth and depth (i.e. the number of 
prior years and the number of current directorships) of a new director’s experience 
is valued by the capital markets. 
I assess how well-connected firms are using four standard measures used in 
network theory. First, a board may be central if it is connected to more boards. Such 
a board is said to be high in Degree centrality (Proctor and Loomis (1951), Freeman 
(1978)), and can be thought of as having many sources and conduits of information 
and support. Second, a board may be central if it is connected to important boards, 
with the importance of a board defined as the number of important boards it is in-
turn connected to. Such a board is said to be high in Eigenvector centrality 
(Bonacich (1972)), and can be thought of as having access to better quality 
10 
 
information and resources. Third, a board may be central if it takes fewer steps to 
get to everyone else in the entire network, the primary idea behind “six degrees3 of 
separation”. Such a board is said to be high in Closeness centrality (Sabidussi 
(1966)), and can be thought of as having a faster speed in information access or 
dissemination to the rest of the network. Fourth, a board may be central if it 
straddles between other groups of boards. Such boards are said to be high in 
Betweenness centrality (Freeman (1978)), and are often thought of as the brokers 
or gatekeepers or chokepoints of information and resources. Finally, the N-score 
Composite centrality measure had its basis on principal component analysis and 
was first proposed by Larcker, et al. (2013). As could be inferred from its name, it 
is a summary statistic of the four centrality measures mentioned above. 
 Degree centrality is a local measure. Betweenness, Closeness and Eigenvector 
centralities are network measures, wherein a small change far away may impact a 
firm’s Eigenvector centrality even though nothing changed in its immediate 
neighborhood. Betweenness and Closeness are somewhat non-intuitive in the way 
it is computed, in that it assumes information and resources flow solely in the 
shortest path connecting two firms, ignoring all other possible but longer paths. This 
appears to be an unrealistic assumption (Kedia and Rajgopal (2009)). What lends 
more intuitive sense are the newer measures of Flow-betweenness (Newman 
(2005)) and Flow-closeness (Stephenson and Zelen (1989)), where all the possible 
paths between two firms are considered in the computation of the final Flow-
betweenness and Flow-closeness scores. The innovation these measures use is the 
analogy from the flow of electrical current between any two points in the network. 
                                                
3 An unfortunate conflation in terminology: “Degree” in “six degrees of separation” refer to 
closeness centrality, the inverse of which is the number of steps needed to reach everyone else in 
the network, which is a fundamentally different concept from degree centrality which measures the 
number of immediate neighbors. 
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Electricity does not flow only via the shortest path or only via the path of least 
resistance. It flows along all paths but in varying amounts inversely proportionate 
to the resistance along that path. This arguably is a more acceptable probabilistic 
model of information flow in the real world. However, very preliminary 
investigations yielded no concrete advantages of these new measures, and so the 
results are not reported in this paper. Similarly, Croci and Grassi (2012) also did 
not find significant differences in results between the Flow-betweenness and 
Betweenness measures. 
One major thrust of this paper is to provide empirical support for a more 
widespread use of weighted projection methods. Existing literature in Corporate 
Finance by seminal papers such as Larcker, et al. (2013) ignore the number of 
interlocks. Some papers use weighted projections without justification (Croci and 
Grassi (2012)). This paper hopes to provide some empirical support to favor the use 
of weighted projection methodologies in future papers in Corporate Finance and 
Management dealing with social network theory. Intuitively, we are modeling the 
board interlocks as conduits for information flow and access to resources, as 
linkages for reciprocal favors. In that light, if two firms are linked by one shared 
director, and two other firms are linked by three directors, we should expect the link 
in the latter case to be stronger than the former. Preserving weightedness in 
projections allows us to model such expectations. 
This paper complements Ang, et al. (2017) in that both papers study the impact 
of interlocking boards on firm performance in Singapore, but there are key 
differences in sample and methodologies. First, their sample covers both Hong 
Kong and Singapore, while this paper focuses only on Singapore. Second, they used 
a director projection of interlocking directorates while this paper uses the board 
12 
 
projection. Third, their centrality variables are binary, above- or below-median, 
whereas this paper uses ordinal quintile variables. The results I obtain augment the 
results of their paper while setting up a basis of comparison for the second part of 
this dissertation. 
In their studies, as robustness checks, Larcker, et al. (2013) controlled for some 
Corporate Governance factors, namely staggered board, poison pill, limits to special 
meeting, percentage of independent directors, CEO-Chairman duality, dual-class 
shares, and the G-index (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003)).  They found that the 
results for board centrality were not affected, suggesting that boardroom related 
governance characteristics are not driving the boardroom centrality results. These 
results do not reconcile fully with this paper, perhaps due to differences in 
Corporate Governance measures used.  
1.1.2    Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance refers to mechanisms concerned with the resolution of 
collective action problems among dispersed investors and the equitable 
reconciliation of conflicts of interest between various claim holders so as to 
maximize the value of the firm to its shareholders (Becht, Bolton and Röell (2003), 
Denis and McConnell (2003)). Arguably the first Corporate Governance paper to 
spark widespread interest in the subject, Gompers, et al. (2003) studied the impact 
of Corporate Governance on firm performance during the 1990s.  They established 
a Governance Index constructed using an index of 24 anti-takeover provisions and 
showed that the “Democratic” portfolio with strongest shareholder rights protection 
outperformed the “Dictatorship” portfolio. They found that a long-Democracy-
short-Dictatorship portfolio had positive abnormal returns.  They also documented 
that firms with stronger shareholder rights had higher firm value, higher profits and 
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sales growth, while concurrently having lower capital expenditures and making few 
acquisitions.  Their ground-breaking work sparked off a wave of follow-up research 
on Corporate Governance. 
Klapper and Love (2004) widened the research coverage to 495 firms across 25 
emerging markets and 18 sectors, and they found a positive correlation between 
market value or operating performance and Corporate Governance.  The 
relationship is accentuated for firms operating in weaker legal environments.  They 
argued that firm-level governance is correlated with variables related to the extent 
of asymmetric information and contracting imperfections facing the firm, which 
they proxied with firm size and asset intangibility, while sales growth acted as a 
proxy for growth opportunities. The study by Durnev and Kim (2005) was similar 
in nature, covering 859 large firms in 27 countries.  Cremers and Nair (2005) found 
that the market for corporate control (external governance) and shareholder 
activism (internal governance) interacts interestingly – firms with the highest level 
of takeover vulnerability outperform only when public pension fund (the block-
holder) ownership is high as well. 
Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) introduced the term, entrenchment index, 
into the vernacular of Corporate Governance research.  This index is based on a 
subset of six out of 24 governance provisions developed by the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). Using Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm 
valuation, they found that higher entrenchment hurts U.S. firm values for the period 
1990 to 2003. 
Bhagat and Bolton (2008) found that firms with better governance 4  are 
                                                
4 Corporate governance measured using the Gompers, et al. (2003) index, Bebchuk, et al. (2009) 
index, stock ownership of board members, and the separation of CEO-Chair. 
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significantly correlated with better operating performance contemporaneously and 
subsequently. However, contrary to earlier studies, the governance measures are 
found to be uncorrelated with subsequent stock market performance, especially 
when one considers the endogenous nature of the relationship between governance 
and stock market performance. They assert that corporate board ownership is a 
better measure of Corporate Governance. 
In terms of international measures of Corporate Governance, in the wake of 
Gompers, et al. (2003), there have been multiple efforts to develop similar indices 
in other countries, such as Korea (Black, Jang and Kim (2006)), Russia (Black, 
Love and Rachinsky (2006)) and Singapore (Goh and Lee (2009)). 
Chapter 1.2    Data and Methodology 
Graph theory is the study of structures used to model relationships between 
objects, with objects represented as nodes or vertices, connected by edges or arcs. 
Network theory provides scaffolding to graph theory to study complex interacting 
systems so that we can study node attributes, edge directedness. In this paper, we 
will use results of these theories in parsing bipartite networks. 
1.2.1    Bipartite Networks Projection 
To the best of my knowledge, nearly all of the recent papers in Corporate 
Finance dealing with Social Network that used centrality, including Larcker, et al. 
(2013), El-Khatib, et al. (2015), Hong (2015), Ang, et al. (2017) used the same 
empirical framework to derive the network of boards or the network of directors. 
One exception is Croci and Grassi (2012) which employed the simple weighted 
projection method. 
If they are building a network of boards, two boards are connected if they share 
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one or more common directors. If they are building a network of directors (which 
may include CEOs in the final analysis), two directors are connected if they share 
one or more common boards. For lack of a better term, I will term this method of 
resolving connectedness the Flat projection. 
An interlocking board network is made up of two types of nodes, the director 
node and the board/firm node. In graph terminology, this graph has two modes, and 
the resultant graph is the typical bipartite graph. There are established ways to deal 
with the transformation of the bipartite graph to the one-mode network which, I 
would argue, have an equal if not stronger theoretical basis than the current practice. 
I will explore two of these projection methods in this paper, the simple weighted 
projection and the collaboration based projection. However, before that, a little 
primer on the bipartite projection process is presented here for ease of reference. 
1.2.1.1    Board and Director Projections from Interlocking Boards 
Bipartite network projection is used widely to compress information about 
bipartite networks. Since the one-mode projection is always less informative than 
the original bipartite graph, an appropriate method for weighting network 
connections is crucial. 
There is an extensive usage of bipartite network projections to convert 
information from the two-mode network to one-mode form. One of the best Figures 
depicting the relationship between bipartite networks and the monopartite 
counterparts I have come across is from Zhou, Ren, Medo and Zhang (2007), from 
which I reproduce the Figure below. 
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In this Figure, Box (a) depicts the bipartite network, which in our case would 
be the interlocking board network.  X-nodes could be thought of as the Directors, 
and the Y-nodes could be thought of as the firms or boards. Box (b) shows the 
Director-projection, and Box (c) the Board-projection. The weights in the edges 
signify the number of common neighbors, using the simple weighted method, 
abbreviated as the Weighted projection in this paper.  
Alternatively, we can assign a weight of one to all the projected edges. In 
Larcker, et al. (2013), two companies are linked if they share at least one board 
member; two companies are not linked if they do not share a board member. This 
treatment of common edges, used commonly in the Accounting and Finance 
literature, loses vital information in translation, and it is easy to might why we 
expect this simplistic projection method, which is called Flat projection in this 
paper, might be thought of as less effective to a weighted one. Nevertheless, 
researchers have been successful in generating many significant results using Flat 
projections, attesting to the relevance of this method, which plausibly could be more 
efficient. 
One notable point about graph components – in the Figure above, you can see 
17 
 
that the number of components in Boxes (b) and (c) are equal. The one-mode 
networks are made up two smaller disconnected components. This is a general 
property of projections of bipartite networks, which you can confirm in this paper 
comparing our Board projection network in Panel 1.2B and Director projection 
network in Panel 1.2D. Note also that the components in Box (b) are unequal in 
node sizes, whereas the components have equal node sizes in Box (c). 
1.2.1.2    Bipartite Projection Weighting Methods 
As indicated earlier, different weighting methods have been proposed to best 
preserve the information from the projection procedure. To illustrate the 
differences, I borrow the excellent illustrations from Opsahl (2013). 
 
(d)  
 
Box (d) shows a simple representation of a bipartite network in its raw form. 
Here, let shaded nodes be directors, and let the labeled nodes be boards or firms. In 
this case, firm A is linked to firm B via two common directors; firm B is linked to 
firm C via one common director. This relationship is summarized and depicted in 
Box (e). 
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(e)  
 
Box (e) illustrates the simple weighting projection weighting methodology. 
This can be formalized as 𝑤"# = 1&  where wij is the weight between node i and 
node j and p is the nodes of the other kind that connects nodes i and j. The astute 
will note that there is more than one way to summarize the weighting information.  
Borrowing a famous economic concept, we may conceive that each additional 
connection will accrue to the firm less and less additional value, in a nod to the law 
of diminishing marginal utility. This idea is embodied in Hyperbolic weighting, or 
what is known as Collaboration weighting, a term derived from scientific paper 
collaboration networks as first described in Newman (2001). The basic idea behind 
this weighting scheme is that for the researchers and published papers bipartite 
network, the relationship between two authors who penned a paper together is 
stronger than two authors who penned a paper together with five other coauthors. 
The weights are formalized as 𝑤"# = '()*'&  where Np is the number of authors on 
paper p. See Box(f) for an illustration of the weighting consequent of applying this 
edge-weighting scheme. 
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(f)  
 
In this dissertation, a thorough inquiry into the significance of the different 
weighting schemes is performed, with the unweighted case termed Flat projection, 
the simple weighted case termed Weighted projection, and the hyperbolic weighted 
case termed Collaboration projection.  
1.2.2    Network Centrality  
Once the projected networks are derived, the next step is to perform the 
centrality scores computation. In this section and this section alone, the convention 
of type-casting all centrality measures in ALLCAPS is adopted for improved 
typographical clarity.  
The concept of connectedness is multi-dimensional.  In graph theory, there are 
many measures that have been concocted, with each measuring a different aspect 
of centrality.  There are four main measures that have been more popularly adopted 
in the Accounting and Finance literature, and they are DEGREE, CLOSENESS, 
BETWEENNESS, and EIGENVECTOR centralities.  These are the same measures 
used in Larcker, et al. (2013) and El-Khatib, et al. (2015). 
Perhaps the simplest centrality measure is DEGREE centrality.  A node is said 
to have high DEGREE centrality if it has many direct connections to other nodes. 
This is the implicit measure used in the earliest social network studies like 
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Engelberg, et al. (2013).  Let δ(i, j) denote an indicator that boards i and j share a 
director, for a given company i in a network.  Then the DEGREE centrality of node 
i is as such: 𝐷𝐸𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐸" ≡ 𝛿 𝑖, 𝑗#4"  
The CLOSENESS centrality measures the total shortest distance to all other 
nodes in the graph. A node has high CLOSENESS it is high when this total distance 
is low, and vice versa.  Let l(i, j) be the number of steps in the shortest path between 
board i and board j, then we have: 
𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆" ≡ 𝑛 − 1𝑙(𝑖, 𝑗)#4"  
BETWEENNESS centrality measures the number of times a node lies on the 
shortest path between two other nodes.  Let Pi(k, j) denote the total number of 
shortest paths between node k and node j, and P(k, j) denote the total number of 
shortest paths between k and j. 
𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑊𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆" ≡ 𝑃" 𝑘, 𝑗 𝑃 𝑘, 𝑗𝑛 − 1 𝑛 − 2 2#4":"∉ G,#  
EIGENVECTOR centrality is a concept that is related to DEGREE centrality 
but which takes into account how important the direct linkages are, following the 
approach Bonacich (1972) outlined.  This measure of influence measures a board’s 
connectedness as well as the connectedness of its direct links and can be thought to 
be a measure of power and prestige.  Let λ be the proportionality factor and gij=1 if 
firms i and j are linked.   𝜆 ∙ 𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌" ≡ 𝑔"# ∙ 𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌##  
In vector form, a firm’s EIGENVECTOR is obtained when we have: 𝜆 ∙ 𝐸𝐼𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑉𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅 ≡ 𝐺 ∙ 𝐸𝐼𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑉𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅 
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Even though DEGREE, CLOSENESS, BETWEENNESS and 
EIGENVECTOR are commonly listed as network centrality measure, DEGREE is 
more of a local measure than a network measure, because it measures only the 
immediate neighborhood of the node. The other three measures of centralities, 
CLOSENESS, BETWEENNESS and EIGENVECTOR, are such that changes in 
one node or one link could have ripple effects affecting nodes far away. While this 
description may allude to the butterfly effect popularized in chaos theory, where a 
small change here causes large changes somewhere else, what we are describing 
here does not predicate on the initial conditions of the system as much as the 
structure of the network. Nonetheless, this work will employ the four measures 
which have secured a firm footing in recent Finance and Accounting literature. The 
other reason is that the preliminary testing of other measures, in particular, FLOW-
BETWEENNESS and FLOW-CLOSENESS centralities as introduced in Newman 
(2005), have yet to bear fruit despite the initial theoretical appeal. 
This paper uses the N-SCORE composite measure as first defined in Larcker, 
et al. (2013) which is an equally weighted average quintile rank in the four centrality 
measures. It was reported that N-Score has a supporting basis for principal 
component analysis of the four network measures. Hence this measure is replicated 
in this paper to evaluate its applicability in new tests. 
𝑁 − 𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 ≡ 𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡 14 𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝐷𝐸𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐸" + 𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆"
+ 𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑊𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆 + 𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝐼𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑉𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅"  
Different papers used slightly different ways to cleanse the centrality measures. 
Larcker, et al. (2013) first sorted the firms into size quintiles year by year, before 
assigning the centrality quintiles. This was done to minimize the mechanical 
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correlation of increased centrality of a board whenever a director is added to the 
board. El-Khatib, et al. (2015) used percentiles of the centrality measures. Ang, et 
al. (2017) created dummy variables to separate centralities above the median from 
those below. Without loss of generality, I have chosen to proceed with ordering 
centrality scores into quintiles every year, an approach closest to Larcker, et al. 
(2013), except that quintiles are not presorted by firm size. 
1.2.3    Board Composition 
The primary source of data for Board information I used in this research is the 
S&P Capital IQ database.  Through its web user interface, I hand-collected board 
composition data for the equities listed in Singapore.   
One unique feature of the S&P Capital IQ board composition dataset is that 
board members of each company also include that of related boards, namely the 
supervisory board members, the management board members, and the board of 
directors for subsidiaries.  This enables us to track loosely connected interlocking 
boards as one, as it is not inconceivable that members of these related boards must 
have more than a fair chance of establishing meaningful connections. 
The S&P Capital IQ dataset collects extensive information on company key 
executives and board members.  In this paper, I downloaded data on both the current 
and prior board members of the companies and amalgamated them to form the final 
dataset.   
According to S&P Capital IQ, their data on people is collated from a spectrum 
of sources, which include Public filings, News, Company websites, Surveys (for 
public companies and private equity firms, Dun & Bradstreet.  Also, their system 
also captures “thousands of press releases daily” to supplement their database for 
key executive moves and board appointments. 
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When Preferred Stock, ETFs, and Closed-End Funds were excluded from the 
search, and the data is sanitized, we are left with 1043 company entities with 
primary listings on the SGX. 
 
The Table above shows the breakdown of the companies by the type as of the 
records in the Capital IQ database. Note that most of them (698) are Public 
Companies, as can be expected. The second largest pie are Private Companies, 
which represents those Public Companies which have been privatized. 
 
The Table above list the breakdown by the current status of the company in the 
database. Predictably the bulk of the companies is still in operation, with a 
substantial chunk being operating subsidiaries or acquired. 
Finally, the Table below lists the companies by the most recent trade date, 
grouped by year. The numbers are the number of firms that are delisted or for 
whatever reasons no longer being listed on the Singapore Exchange. Note that 
delisted companies do not fall out of the sample to minimize the effects of 
survivorship bias.   
Company Type Total
Corporate Investment Arm 1
Private Company 291
Private Investment Firm 4
Public Company 698
Public Fund 22
Public Investment Firm 27
Grand Total 1043
Company Status Total
Acquired 64
Liquidating 6
Operating 692
Operating Subsidiary 278
Out of Business 1
Reorganizing 2
Grand Total 1043
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Of the list of 1043 firms listed on the SGX main and secondary boards, 14 of 
the firms had no information on their board members whatsoever, so there are only 
1029 firms with board member information. 
1.2.4    Singapore Corporate Governance Index 
The Singapore Corporate Governance Index (SCGI) consists of 84 questions 
(including sub-questions) which are classified into five OECD Corporate 
Governance principles: rights of shareholders, equitable treatment of shareholders, 
the role of stakeholders, disclosure and transparency, and board responsibilities.  
These questions were developed from the five OECD governance principles and 
modified to fit the Singapore context. They examine the Corporate Governance 
practices of the listed companies from the public shareholders’ perceptive using 
information in the public domain. The data sources include annual reports, notices 
to call shareholder’s meetings, general meeting minutes, company websites, analyst 
reports, proxy voting forms, and other sources.  
For the rights of shareholders, they examine how shareholders can participate 
Most Recent Trade Date in Year Total
1999 1
2001 1
2002 6
2003 9
2004 36
2005 10
2006 20
2007 15
2008 28
2009 23
2010 33
2011 31
2012 28
2013 28
2014 39
2015 34
2016 701
Grand Total 1043
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in major company decisions. For example, can shareholders ask questions in the 
Annual General Meetings (AGMs), and can shareholders nominate or remove 
directors? They also examine the amount of information disclosed in the notice to 
call AGMs and a company’s anti-takeover defenses.  
For the equitable treatment of shareholders, they examine whether the 
companies facilitate proxy voting by minority shareholders. They also include 
questions on the disclosure of insider trading.  
For the role of stakeholders in Corporate Governance, they examine the 
company disclosure of employee benefits, welfare and long-term incentive 
schemes, and disclosure on environmental issues.  
For disclosure and transparency, they assess the amount of information 
(financial and non-financial) disclosed in the company annual report and the 
company website, and investigate if the firms disclose a transparent ownership 
structure?  
For board responsibilities, they assess the monitoring role of the board using 
questions on the board's activities, board composition and possible conflict of 
interest. 
The scores for the five sub-indices are aggregated to derive the final index score. 
I obtain proprietary data from the team behind the Singapore Corporate 
Governance Index, which developed a scorecard measure specific for the Singapore 
corporate landscape. According to  Goh and Lee (2009), their database covers all 
SGX mainboard-listed companies, excluding exchange-traded funds, funds, 
secondary listings, structured products, real estate investment trusts and OTC for 
international securities listed overseas.  
Most questions (61%) are strictly binary. For the other questions, they add a 
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qualitative element to governance practices to assess the quantity and quality of 
information with a clear standard to identify good, fair or poor practices. For 
example, one of the questions asks “Among Board of directors, how many are 
independent directors5?” If the percentage of independent directors is above 50%, 
then the company will be classified as “good”. If the percentage is below 33%, the 
company will get “poor”. The companies where the percentage of independent 
directors ranges between 33% and 50% are ranked “fair”. Each response is cross-
checked for consistency and accuracy by different raters.  
Each category carries a weighting: rights of shareholders (15%); equitable 
treatment of shareholders (10%); roles of stakeholders (15%); disclosure and 
transparency (20%); and board responsibilities and composition (40%). Major 
questions under each category and sub-questions under each major question are 
equally weighted. They then combine question scores into a sub-index for each 
category and combine sub-indices into an overall index. The sub- and overall index 
are rescaled from 0 (worst) to 100 (best).  
The first two categories, which are assigned a total weight of 25%, are 
associated with minority shareholders’ protection, which is crucial in Singapore 
market because of the prevalence of substantial block-holders. Information 
disclosure and board responsibilities, together carry a weight of 60%, are widely 
discussed topics in Corporate Governance practices. The role of stakeholder 
category carrying a weight of 15% is effectively corporate social responsibility 
which is becoming increasingly important. 
                                                
5 Unlike other developed markets, Singapore is slower in requiring independent directors of listed 
non-financial companies to be independent of controlling shareholders as well as management 
(Attig (2007)). According to the Code of Corporate Governance issued in 2001 and updated in 
2005, independent director should have no relationship with the company, its related companies or 
its officers. In 2012, the Code of Corporate Governance was revised to state that independent 
directors should be independent of the management as well as 10% shareholders. 
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1.2.5    Firm Performance and Control Variables 
1.2.5.1    Performance 
The use of return-on-assets is the de-facto gold standard in measuring firm 
performance, and so I will also use in our investigation. It is trivial to point out it is 
used for purposes of easy comparability of the results of this paper with Larcker, et 
al. (2013).  
Tobin’s Q has become a ubiquitous measure of firm valuation, used by many 
papers in Corporate Finance (such as Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Morck, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1988), Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2002)). On the 
other hand, there have been dissenting voices about the use, or rather, abuse, of this 
variable to assess firm performance. As pointed out in Dybvig and Warachka 
(2015), underinvestment increases rather than decreases Tobin’s Q, which calls into 
question the validity of this firm performance proxy. Nonetheless, since this 
measure had been used so often, especially in the sub-field of Corporate 
Governance, it seems apt to utilize this proxy and note its response to the pivotal 
centrality variables of our research. 
Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio of the market value of the firm’s assets to the 
book value of the firm’s assets. In this paper the calculation of Tobin’s Q that was 
used approximates the market value of the firm’s assets as the sum of two 
components, the market value of equity and the book value of liabilities. 
1.2.5.2    Control Variables 
A proper set of control variables is imperative to avoid omitted variable bias. 
To this end, we have chosen a curated list of variables using extant literature for 
guidance. The complete list of variables and their corresponding abbreviations used 
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is tabulated in Table I.1.   
The variables that were used include quick ratio, net sales, firm age, asset 
growth, leverage, the ratio of selling, general and administrative expenses to total 
assets, and the industry Herfindahl-Hirschman index.  
Quick Ratio is a proxy for the liquidity level of the firm.  
Net Sales, expressed in logarithm form, is used as a proxy for firm size. 
We follow Jiraporn and Chintrakarn (2013) in designating Selling, general and 
administrative expenses, which is largely subject to managerial discretion, as a 
proxy for agency conflict between the managers and owners. 
Leverage is used as a proxy for growth opportunities as in Lang, Ofek and Stulz 
(1996), and a proxy for business risk as in Hurdle (1974) 
Asset growth is used as a proxy for financial stability (Beasley, Carcello, 
Hermanson and Lapides (2000)). 
Firm age is a proxy for the maturity of the firm in terms of the firm’s  life-cycle 
(Dickinson (2011)). 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index of industry concentration is used as a proxy 
for the degree of imperfect competition, as noted in Lang and Stulz (1992). The 
index we used for this paper is constructed based on total assets of the firm. 
There are no board variables used as controls explicitly in the regressions.  
Instead, I rely on the Singapore Corporate Governance Index to control for board 
variables in the robustness checks. 
1.2.6    Endogeneity and Regression Methods 
No research paper in Corporate Finance is complete without a discussion on 
endogeneity. This paper addresses the endogeneity problems in two main ways. 
To rule out the problems of omitted variables, we have subjected the 
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multivariate regressions to a curated list of firm control variables that have been 
shown to affect firm performance while avoiding the kitchen sink approach. In this 
respect, the potential problem of omitted variables is minimized.  
This paper has taken a pragmatic approach to rule out reverse causality. Except 
for the very few cases where contemporaneous dependent variables are used and 
presented for comparison purposes, this paper typically uses look-ahead dependent 
variables. Most of the dependent variables are constructed on a one-year look-ahead 
basis. 
As for Measurement Bias, nothing in this paper is directly hand collected and 
stored in a proprietary database. There may be gaps or error in the board 
membership data, especially the years-on-board variable which was relied on to 
form the network connections. Much of the information which must be hand or 
machine compiled by databases like Capital IQ may include measurement errors, 
but there is no reason to believe these are systemic. In any case since data error or 
omissions when reported to Capital IQ are corrected after factual counterchecks, 
we have good reasons to believe the integrity of the databases is improving over 
time. 
Gormley and Matsa (2014) has shown that common research practices of using 
industry-demeaned (or industry-adjusted) dependent variables and adding the mean 
of the group's dependent variable to control for unobserved heterogeneity, tended 
to yield inconsistent estimates. Rather, the fixed effects estimator should be used 
instead.  
Hence, following Gormley and Matsa (2014), the major regressions used in this 
paper controlled for fixed effects at the industry-year level, using Fama-French ten 
industries as referenced in Fama and French (1997). This is done to ensure there is 
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at least a firm in each industry while at the same time not generating too many fixed 
effects that would reduce the power of the regression analyses.  
The regressions in this paper uses clustering at the firm level for Standard Errors 
by default to control for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within the panel. 
The firm variable is indicated in the regression tables by the abbreviation ecid 
(which stands for excel company id), a unique firm identifier used by the Capital 
IQ databases.  
Chapter 1.3    Hypothesis Development 
The first hypothesis is motivated by the idea that interlocking boards provide 
the conduits through which information and resources flow, and the most central 
boards are the ones who would benefit most from this network topology. The 
benefit that accrues to the firm would be evidenced in its corporate performance 
which we can observe via the accounting-based measure of return-on-assets, and 
the finance-based measure of Tobin’s Q. The former is a direct extension of the 
results obtained in Larcker, et al. (2013) using a similar methodology.  
H1: Firms with better-connected boards have better firm performance  
The second idea is motivated by the idea that the effects of highly central boards 
show persistence empirically, which could be a result of highly central boards being 
exposed to more opportunities and resources to maintain their high centrality and 
therefore their firm performance. Alternatively, highly central boards may be more 
able to leverage their social capital and enjoy better access to other highly qualified 
directors to help maintain their high centrality and firm performance (Nicholson, 
Alexander and Kiel (2004)). In this respect, the second hypothesis attempts to 
answer the question on how persistent is the impact of today’s connected boards on 
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future firm performance in the one- to four-year medium-term window. 
H2: Firms with better-connected boards have better firm performance  
in the medium term 
The third hypothesis we test in this paper is that the slightly more sophisticated 
ways to project interlocking boards networks to the subset of board nodes should 
be used instead of the Flat projection method commonly documented in Corporate 
Finance papers on social network centrality. The theoretical motivation is to 
preserve information while dealing with board or director projections. The evidence 
we present in this paper provides empirical rationale. 
H3: Simple Weighted and Hyperbolic Weighted Collaboration Weighting 
methods for interlocking board projections are superior to the Flat method  
Chapter 1.4    Analysis and Results 
1.4.1    Network Statistics 
Table I.2 lists the Network Graph statistics for the interlocking board networks. 
In Panel I.2A, we can see that the number of interlocking boards in the networks is 
steadily growing in size over the years, from 181 boards in the year 1989 to a peak 
of 946 boards in the year 2014. This steady increase is likely due to augmented 
efforts in collecting more comprehensive board member data by Capital IQ, 
especially over the period 1989 to 2004. As noted earlier, these boards are boards 
of firms listed on the SGX mainboard and Catalist.  
The number of boards would increasingly exceed the actual number of listed 
companies because Capital IQ maintains research on companies that may have been 
delisted but whose board member data is available to them via other means. For 
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example, CapitaMalls Asia was delisted on July 22, 2014, but current board 
member data is still being collected on this entity. The CEO data is current because 
there is a new CEO after the delisting event. According to Capital IQ, “Mr. Juan 
Thong Leow, also known as Jason, has been the Chief Executive Officer of 
CapitaMalls Asia Limited since September 15, 2014.” The financial data of delisted 
entities may not be available, in which case the firm will drop out of the sample set 
in the final regression analyses, but a considered decision is taken to include these 
firms in the computation of network centrality data. 
Statistics presented in Panel I.2C and D are on the bipartite projection on the 
subset of Director nodes, a comparison counterpart to Panel I.2A and B 
respectively. They are presented to give the reader a better appreciation of the 
resultant projection on directors and how the topology of the network differs from 
the projection of connected boards. From Panels I.2A and C, it is observed that the 
ratio of the universe of directors to boards is 3-4 times.  
A component is a subgraph in which the nodes are all connected directly or 
indirectly, and no nodes in the component are connected to any other outside nodes 
in the supergraph. Comparing Panels I.2B and D, we can see that the number of 
components every year is the same for the board and the director projection. Even 
though that is true, the director projection has more components of at least size 2, 
whereas the board projection has more singleton components. In both networks, the 
size of the largest component eclipses that of the second largest component, 
especially so after 1997.  
From the director network, centralities of the directors, and therefore of the 
CEOs, can be computed, but these are not elaborated upon further in this 
dissertation. 
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1.4.2    Summary Statistics 
In Table I.3, the summary statistics are presented.  Panel I.3A reports the firm 
variables. In Panels I.3B, I.3C and I.3D, the network centrality metrics are 
presented, under the flat projection, weighted projection and collaboration 
projection respectively. Of the four centrality measures, the variables with suffix q 
are quintile variables, and they share similar distributions. The Betweenness, 
Closeness, and Eigenvector centrality measures are normalized in relation to the 
size of the network, a practice that is common to facilitate comparison across 
different networks (such as across different years). The degree centrality measure 
is not normalized because the unnormalized version has an intuitive and explicit in 
interpretation. Under the flat projection, the median board has direct connections 
(Fd) to 3 other boards. Under the weighted projection, we observe that the median 
firm has four linkages to (1 to 4) other boards. Under the Collaboration projection, 
the degree of the median firm is two. 
1.4.3    Correlation Matrices 
Table I.4 contains three Panels that show the Pearson correlation between the 
main firm variables and the Board network centrality variables.  The network 
centralities under the different projection methods are understandably highly 
correlated and are omitted here for the sake of brevity. 
Panel I.4A has the centrality measures calculated under the (unweighted) Flat 
projection, Panel I.4B has the centrality measures under the (simple) Weighted 
projection, and Panel I.4C has the centrality measures under the (hyperbolic 
weighted) Collaboration projection.  
We can see the highly significant positive correlation between the one-year look 
ahead return-on-assets, and Degree and Composite N-score centralities, whereas for 
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Tobin’s Q we observe that Closeness centrality has a significant but negative 
correlation with one-year look-ahead return-on-assets.  
Looking at Panel I.4A, we see that among the Betweenness, Closeness, Degree 
and Eigenvector centralities, the highest correlation is the Betweenness-Degree pair 
at 0.77, while the lowest correlation pair is Closeness-Eigenvector at 0.21. In 
Larcker, et al. (2013), their highest correlated pair is also Betweenness-Degree at 
0.898, and their lowest correlated pair is similarly Closeness-Eigenvector at 0.242. 
1.4.4    Differences in Means  
Before running the actual regressions, it is helpful to get a sense of the 
differences in means between the centralities with a test of differences in means of 
the key response variables return-on-assets and Tobin’s Q, between centrality 
scores above and below the medians. 
1.4.4.1    ROA 
Panel I.5A presents the results for the differences in means of high and low 
centralities scores under (Unweighted) Flat projection. Looking at the t-tests for 
Betweenness, Closeness and Degree centralities are significant at the 1% level, 
while that for Eigenvector is significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, the firms with 
boards with centralities above the median all have higher return-on-assets compared 
to those below the median.  The results are consistent with what the correlation 
analyses had earlier suggested. When the same tests are performed on centralities 
computed under the Simple Weighted and Collaboration Projections, the results are 
similar, except that the t-test Eigenvector centrality is highly significant at the 1% 
level instead. 
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1.4.4.2    Tobin’s Q 
On the same Panels described earlier (Panels I.5A, B and C) the results for 
Tobin’s Q using the same differences in means methodology is presented in the 
second row after that of return-on-assets. As opposed to the clear and unambiguous 
results obtained for return-on-assets, the results for Tobin’s Q are inconclusive, 
regardless of the projection method used. This is expected and in line with the 
results obtained using correlations in the earlier section.  
1.4.5    Firm Performance and Board Centralities 
1.4.5.1    ROA 
Table I.6 has two panels showing the results of the regressions for firm 
performance and multiple board centrality measured obtained under the unweighted 
Flat projection method. As mentioned in the methodology section, we avoided 
using industry adjusted variables and proceeded with the approach of using fixed 
effects estimators instead, following Gormley and Matsa (2014). 
Equations 1 to 5 of Panel I.6A are univariate regressions of the centrality 
measures. You can see that Betweenness, Closeness, Degree, Eigenvector and 
Composite N-score centralities all have highly significant positive coefficients, 
again corroborating with earlier results.  
Equations 6 to 10 of Panel I.6A are multivariate regressions of return-on-assets 
and the various centrality measures. The coefficient values are all attenuated 
compared to the respective univariate regression cases, but they retain their 
significance at the 1% level (except degree centrality at 5%), as well as the positive 
direction of the effects on the response variable one-year ahead return-on-assets. 
The results of the same regressions under the simple weighted projection and 
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collaboration projection are similar to that obtained for flat projection and are not 
reported for the sake of brevity. 
The strong results achieved mirrors what was obtained by Larcker, et al. (2013), 
because in their paper they were implicitly using a Flat projection of the bipartite 
network.  What was unknown but established, is that similar results are obtained 
even if we used simple weighted projection or the hyperbolic weighted 
collaboration projection methods. These results also concur with those by Ang, et 
al. (2017). 
Now that we established at the outset that the primary results or Larcker, et al. 
(2013) are applicable to the Singapore market, we are ready to branch out from this 
basis to extend the investigation to other interesting research questions, such as the 
applicability on the other key measure usually used in Corporate Finance literature, 
Tobin’s Q. 
1.4.5.2    Tobin’s Q 
Refer to Table I.6B for the results of the regressions of Tobin’s Q on various 
measures of board centralities derived under the unweighted Flat projection. 
Panel I.6B, equations 1 through 5 show the results of the univariate regressions 
of Tobin’s Q on the individual board centralities measures. We can see that although 
the coefficients for the centrality measures are all positive, the results are 
insignificant. These results corroborate what was revealed earlier in the correlation 
analysis and the differences-in-means test. 
Equations 6 to 10 of Panel I.6B show that multivariate regression gives us 
interesting results. A unit increase Betweenness centrality will increase Tobin’s Q 
by 0.088 at the 1% significance level. Results for Closeness centrality, eigenvector 
centrality, and composite centrality are positive and significant at the 5% level. 
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Degree centrality has the weakest result at 10% level, but the coefficient is positive.  
The results of the same regressions under the simple weighted projection and 
collaboration projection are similar to those obtained for flat projection and are not 
reported to avoid verbosity. 
Collectively, these results point to the fact that the centrality measures may have 
a more direct impact on Tobin’s Q than previously thought (since no papers have 
reported this link before). 
1.4.6    Future Firm Performance and Composite Board Centralities 
 “What is the persistence of a firm’s board centrality score?” is the direct 
question addressed in this section. What are the long-term effects of a board 
network? The related question is to ask what the half-life of a network is, to get an 
inkling of the rate of decay of effects of networks. I investigate these effects directly 
using the same regression methodology used in the previous section.  
Taking guidance from Larcker, et al. (2013) who developed the composite N-
Score centrality, we will use this measure to test the persistence of centralities of 
interlocking board networks. In their paper, they tested similar ideas, albeit using a 
pooled regression framework and using industry-adjusted variables which could 
have the problems of inconsistent standard errors as pointed out in Gormley and 
Matsa (2014). 
Table I.7 has the regressions of future firm performance on composite board 
centralities under the Flat projection method. 
1.4.6.1    ROA 
Panel I.7A presents the results of regressions of contemporaneous and look-
ahead return-on-assets on Composite N-score centralities obtained under a Flat 
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projection.  
In equation 1, we see that contemporaneous univariate regression is significant 
at the 5% level. In equation 2, we see that the contemporaneous multivariate 
regression is insignificant. These results are not surprising. Equations 3 and 4 are 
the same as Panel I.6A (5) and (10) and are presented here for ease of reference and 
comparison. Equations 5 and 6 show the 2-year look-ahead effect of N-score 
composite centrality on return-on-assets. Equations 7 and 8 show the same for 3-
year look-ahead effect. Equations 9 and 10 show the 4-year look ahead effect. 
For the look-ahead regressions (Equations 3 to 10), the coefficients for N-score 
composite centralities are all positive and significant at the 1% level, except for 
two-year look-ahead multivariate regression at 5%. The coefficients for the 
multivariate case are all attenuated compared to the univariate counterparts.  
The results of the same regressions under the simple weighted projection and 
collaboration projection are similar to those obtained for flat projection and are not 
reported. 
Feyen (2013) found that only active interlock connections matter in relation to 
stock valuations of firms, once the regressions control for past interlocks the results 
disappear, which is consistent with a resource allocation view of boards.  This paper 
uses another angle, which investigates the persistence of effects of interlock 
networks. It is found that the effects of today’s interlock persist for at least four 
years. The way to reconcile the ostensibly conflicting results is that while Feyen 
(2013) is structured like an event study with everything lined up at event time, this 
paper looks at how far we can peer into the future based on data today. 
1.4.6.2    Tobin’s Q 
Panel I.7A presents the results of regressions of contemporaneous and look-
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ahead Tobin’s Q on Composite N-score centralities obtained using a Flat projection.  
Equations 1 and 2 are contemporaneous regressions for the univariate case and 
multivariate case respectively. The coefficients for composite board centrality are 
both positive at the 10% level.  Equations 3 and 4 are reproduced from Panel I.6B 
(5) and (10) to facilitate comparisons and for easy referencing. Equations 5 and 6 
show the 2-year look-ahead effect of N-score composite centrality on return-on-
assets. Equations 7 and 8 show the same for 3-year look-ahead effect. Equations 9 
and 10 show the 4-year look ahead effect. 
For the look-ahead univariate regressions i.e. Panel I.7B (3), (5), (7), (9), are 
positive but insignificant, except for four-year look-ahead Tobin’s Q showing up at 
5% significance. However, all the multivariate regressions Panel I.7B (4), (6), (8), 
(10) have positive and highly significant coefficients for composite board centrality. 
The results of the same regressions under the simple weighted projection and 
collaboration projection are similar to that obtained for flat projection and are not 
reported here since they do not add much value. 
The results in Panel 1.7B all allude to the fact that interlock centralities may 
have a more lasting impact on firms’ Tobin’s Q than previously thought and 
reported.   
Chapter 1.5    Robustness Checks  
1.5.1    Corporate Governance and Board Centralities 
In this section, we will explore the relationship uncovered in the earlier sections 
between the corporate performance variables (of return-on-assets and Tobin’s Q), 
and centralities obtained under the unweighted Flat projection method of resolving 
interlocking board connections.  
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The two panels in Table I.8 contain the analyses on the subsample of firms with 
scores on the Singapore Corporate Governance Index (SCGI). 
1.5.1.1    ROA and Centralities 
Panel I.8A (1) to (5) should be read in conjunction with Panel I.6A as an 
extension of the results. When controlled for the Corporate Governance, it is 
observed that all the centrality variants lose their significance.  
This is unexpected because this is not the results obtained by Larcker, et al. 
(2013) when they controlled for Governance factors in their tests and they still got 
strong positive results.  
Our results also differ from Ang, et al. (2017), potentially because they used 
median dummies instead of quintiles for the centrality variables. Also, their study 
differs in that they include the Hong Kong market as well in their analyses. 
There are at least two reasons to explain this phenomenon. First, the nature of 
firms listed on American and Singaporean stock markets are different such that 
SCGI explains board centralities whereas in the United States this is not the case. 
Second, the Corporate Governance measure used is different in type and potency 
from those used in Larcker, et al. (2013), and the SCGI overlaps more completely 
with centrality measures. While I used one consolidated variable to control for 
Corporate Governance, they used a lineup of variables instead for robustness 
testing, specifically the presence of a staggered board, the existence of poison pills 
and dual-class shares, whether the firm has limits to calling special meetings, the 
percent of independent directors, CEO-Chairman duality, and the shareholder rights 
governance index (G-index) of Gompers, et al. (2003).  
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1.5.1.2    Tobin’s Q and Centralities 
Panel I.8A (6) to (10) should be read in conjunction with Panel I.6B as an 
extension of the results. 
Whereas the results disappeared for the regressions on return-on-assets, the 
results for Tobin’s Q are only slightly better. Betweenness centrality and Composite 
N-score centrality both lost significance. Closeness centrality diminished in 
significance, moving from 5% to 10%. Degree centrality and Eigenvector centrality 
retain their significance level even when controlled for Corporate Governance.  
1.5.1.3    Future ROA and Composite Centrality 
Panel I.8B (1) to (5) should be read in conjunction with Panel I.7A as an 
extension of the results.  
When controlled for Corporate Governance, all the centralities lost their 
significance in explaining look-ahead return-on-assets. This is unexpected, and a 
cursory conclusion might imply that centralities are controlling for the same things 
the SCGI captures in its index.  
1.5.1.4    Future Tobin’s Q and Composite Centrality 
Panel I.8B (6) to (10) should be read in conjunction with Panel I.7B as an 
extension of the results.  
When controlled for Corporate Governance, the centralities lose their ability to 
explain look-ahead Tobin’s Q. This is expected now because of the earlier results 
obtained in Table I.8. 
1.5.2    Weighted / Collaboration Projection on Firm Performance 
Given the negative results obtained in Table I.8, where the significance of 
centralities in predicting firm performance all but vanishes when controlling for the 
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SCGI factor, I will repeat Table I.8, but using the Weighted and Collaboration 
projection methods for computing centralities. As noted earlier in the Methodology 
section, the theoretical basis for Weighted and Collaboration projection is stronger 
than for Flat projections, but results have not been reported because until now the 
Flat projection performed satisfactorily in the space explored by extant literature. 
Table I.9 should be read in conjunction with Panel 1.8A as an extension of the 
results. 
1.5.2.1    Weighted Board Centralities 
Comparing Panel I.9A to Panel I.8A, we can see at a glance that under the 
simple weighted projection, eigenvector centrality shone through at the 1% 
significance level, for explaining both return-on-assets and Tobin’s Q. That aside, 
all the coefficients on the other centralities are positive but insignificant. One 
exception is Weighted Betweenness centrality which reports the same coefficient 
magnitude and standard deviation and significance at the 10% level under both Flat 
and Weighted projections.  
1.5.2.2    Collaboration Board Centralities 
Comparing Panel I.9B to Panels I.8A and I.9A, we can see that Collaboration 
eigenvector centrality once again performs better than the other centrality measures 
in explaining return-on-assets.  
For Tobin’s Q, both Betweenness and Eigenvector centralities report 
significance at 5% level, with the N-score centrality significant at the 10% level. 
1.5.3    Using Projection Eigenvector Centrality on Future Firm Performance 
Looking at the results in Table I.9 in aggregate, it is unclear which projection 
method is empirically superior. Both seem to be valid alternatives, and both point 
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to eigenvector centrality as the better choice for measuring centrality compared to 
Betweenness, Closeness, Degree and even N-score composite centrality, 
surprisingly. 
With that in mind, this paper will extend the results in Table I.8 using 
eigenvector centrality instead of N-score composite centrality, for Flat, Weighted 
and Collaboration projections, presented in Panels I.10A, B and C respectively. 
1.5.3.1     Flat Board Eigenvector Centralities 
As expected, the Flat projection board eigenvector centralities were muted in 
their ability to explain firm performance. Comparing the results in Panel I.10A to 
Panel I.8B, we can conclude that Eigenvector factor performed better than the 
composite N-score factor which was insignificant in all of the regressions for look-
ahead firm performance. In contrast, Eigenvector centrality at least managed to eke 
out a 5% significance for the one-year look ahead Tobin’s Q and a 10% significance 
for four-year look-ahead Tobin’s Q. Still, these are relatively weak results and is 
likely symptomatic of the deeper systemic issues with using the simplistic Flat 
projection.  
1.5.3.2    Weighted Board Eigenvector Centralities  
Panel I.10B show the results for Weighted Eigenvector centrality. The 
regressions for one-year and four-year look-ahead regressions on return-on-assets 
managed to clock a 5% significance, better than under the Flat projection case in 
Panel I.10A. 
What’s more promising is that the results of Tobin’s Q, one-, two-, three-, and 
four-year look-ahead regressions managed a 1% significance level for Weighted 
Eigenvector centrality. 
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1.5.3.3    Collaboration Board Eigenvector Centralities 
Panel I.10C show the results for Collaboration Eigenvector centrality. 
Comparing to Weighted projection in Panel I.10B, the results for return-on-assets 
are stronger, with a 1% significance for one- and four-year look ahead return-on-
assets and lesser but still valid significance for the two- and three-year ones.  
On the other hand, the Tobin’s Q results under Collaboration projection are 
much weaker than under the Weighted Projection. A 1% significance is obtained 
only for four-year look-ahead Tobin’s Q, while two-, three-, and four-year look-
ahead Tobin’s Q register significance at the 5% level.  
Chapter 1.6    Conclusion 
The results in this Part are consistent with boardroom connections providing 
information and resources and the benefits that accrue to the firms are discernable 
from both the return-on-assets as well as the Tobin’s Q measures.  
The effects to the firm of boardroom connections today have been shown to 
persist for at least four years on both return-on-assets and Tobin’s Q. 
One of the key contributions of this research is to highlight that the method of 
mapping the connected boards do matter, and to use the Flat projection is to leave 
money on the table insofar as information preservation of the network is concerned. 
It will be a worthwhile impact if the only one from this research is to highlight that 
it would be more accurate for future research to be based on weighted or 
collaboration network weighting projections instead. 
As shown in the robustness tests, the simple weighted Eigenvector metrics 
performed better for predicting Tobin’s Q in the one- to four-year look-ahead 
timeframe, while the hyperbolic weighted collaboration Eigenvector performed 
better for predicting future return-on-assets in the same timeframe. More tests may 
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need to be done to determine the appropriate projection method and the associated 
interpretation at broader and deeper levels of analyses. 
Eigenvector centrality was used exclusively in Feyen (2013), a perhaps 
incidental choice but nonetheless vindicated by the results of this dissertation. Even 
though at this moment I do not have an answer why Eigenvector centrality is 
superior, I like to think that this is because Eigenvector centrality is closely related 
to PageRank centrality, which is the algorithm that Google built its empire upon. 
There are two key differences that Eigenvector centrality has; firstly, it does not 
have a scaling factor, and secondly, PageRank is a left-hand eigenvector, because 
directionality of linkages is involved. With the computation of a single centrality 
score Google conquered the internet, and so it is little surprise that Eigenvector 
centrality can be an informative variable. The other probably more likely reason is 
that Betweenness, Closeness and Degree replicate information that is summarized 
in the SCGI. 
  
46 
 
Part 2.    Follow the Money, Stupid! – A Treatise on Connected Owners 
The second section deals with a new concept which I term “ownership 
centrality”, borrowing from and extending similar concepts used in the evaluation 
of interlocking board centralities.  Some papers dealing with ownership issues use 
variables such as ownership wedge and ownership dispersion to measure potential 
agency conflicts within the corporate entities.  Other papers use various 
permutations of ownership dummies to proxy for ownership. 
This section endeavors to uncover whether we can we extend the concept of 
centrality measures to the myriad web of interlocking and overlapping ownership 
stakes, to develop it as a credible and hopefully better proxy for measuring 
ownership and better identify potential ownership conflict of interests.  As a proof 
of concept, I will focus this line of probing in the sandbox of the Singapore stock 
market.  
The motivation of this line of research was met with much resistance from the 
outset. Unlike Interlocking Boards, which links firms through board relationships 
at the personal level, where we could proxy for informational exchange, resource 
allocation facilitation and stewardship consultations, the ownership network is 
more complicated. The web of ownership control is multimodal, it has companies 
owning companies, and sometimes the ownership is through a hierarchical pyramid 
to a penultimate family firm or person, sometimes complicated by cross-holdings, 
and the state may own firms too.  
Another crucial obstacle is that the corporate ownership relationship is 
essentially one of cashflow rights, which should not influence the operations of the 
firm, and control rights, which is usually exercised only once a year at the Annual 
General Meeting, which is an orchestrated event where binary votes to approve 
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resolutions are decided. Thus, the real operational control powers of the 
shareholders lie in the Board of Directors who represent the shareholders, so this 
line of reasoning speedily dismisses the relevance of ownership centrality, in favor 
of board centrality.  
A third complication is that the ownership connection between the firms and 
their owners implies both directionality and weightedness in the relationship, which 
are concepts with standard treatment methods in graph and network theories, but 
the methods have yet to catch on in the Business research corpus, so there is no 
prior guidance on the best approach for this endeavor. 
After much research into sophisticated methodology and advanced theory (and 
on the verge of giving up), this paper was saved by a niggling discomfort.  Having 
done the board centrality computations, I made the serendipitous observation that 
the names of the current CEOs of Temasek Holdings (Ching, Ho) and Temasek 
International (Theng Kiat, Lee) did not feature in the list of Directors with high 
eigenvector centralities, or any of the other measured centralities for the matter. 
This eventually led to the breakthrough revelation that in fact the problem should 
be and could be couched in simpler terms, and using the same methods I have used 
in Part I could yield results. So even though when presented in the final form it may 
seem trivial in retrospect, it was absolutely non-intuitive ex-ante.  
Having established how ownership centrality is useful, I endeavor to link up 
this concept with the prevailing knowledge base on Corporate Governance. Where 
and how does ownership centrality fit into the overall scheme of things, if at all? 
Do these centrality measures help enhance our current methods? I hope the results 
will be instructive in helping to guide developments and enhancements in future 
formulations of best practices in Corporate Governance. The hope is that within the 
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scope of investigations of this paper we will derive a useful measure and 
understanding of ownership centrality. 
The biggest value of this piece of research is to document its multiple attempts 
to model ownership centrality using cutting edge summary measures from network 
theory. Both the successful and the failed attempts will instruct future research as 
to whether my approach holds promise in describing complex corporate ownership 
phenomenon, and whether there is a meaningful impact of this novel measure on 
corporate outcomes.   
Chapter 2.1    Literature Review 
2.1.1    Firm Ownership 
When we look at connected boards, we view the firm interlocks as conduits of 
information, support, and resources. The expectation is that a highly central firm 
would be able to harness and hoard information and gain better access to scarce 
resources thereby enhancing firm value. However, when we look at connected 
owners, the connections represent the cashflow rights of the owners from the firms, 
and control rights of the firm by the owners. Each ownership link represents the 
conduit through which cash and influence flow, albeit in opposite directions. In this 
sense, the relationship is bidirectional and could justify the usage of an undirected 
network. A highly central owner in this framework receives more cashflow and can 
exert much more influence, command and control than the less central owners. 
The literature has accumulated significant evidence that boardroom connections 
drive corporate outcomes, but none yet for interlinked ownership connections in the 
social network sense. Notwithstanding, there are studies alluding to the strong 
linkages between strong ownership stakes and firm outcomes. Okhmatovskiy 
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(2010) asserted that governments not only regulate business activities but also 
become involved in the Corporate Governance of individual firms, not only through 
board memberships but also through ownership ties. Since the body of Corporate 
Finance literature has accepted and formalized the role of board centrality as a firm 
characteristic in determining corporate performance, it seems timely, and entirely 
logical, that ownership centrality should function as a viable firm characteristic as 
well. 
In my opinion, one unique feature that allows our analyses to work is a feature 
of the database we use, which uses roll-up logic to unravel complicated ownership 
structures. Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis (2000) reconciled the phenomena of 
dispersed ownership against the reality of actual tight control by block-holders with 
what they termed controlling-minority structures used by block-holders to exert 
influence and control through three mechanisms – dual-class shares, stock 
pyramids, and cross-ownership ties. In Singapore, dual-class shares are not allowed 
and so can be ignored. As for pyramidal-holdings and cross-holdings, the web of 
ownership is unraveled at the database level using roll-up logic, so future 
researchers can access the same dataset for replication with little fuss and hassle.  
A classic example of cross-holdings would be the Jardine Group. The Jardine 
Group is under the control of the Keswick brothers, whose combined stake of less 
than 10 percent in Jardine Matheson is amplified via complicated cross-holdings 
(Chan, Hameed and Lau (2003)). As of end-2014, the top 5 owners of Jardine 
Strategic Holdings Limited were Jardine Matheson Holdings Limited (66%), 
OppenheimerFunds Inc (2%), Franklin Resources Inc (2%), Schroder Investment 
Management (Singapore) Ltd (1%) and Norges Bank Investment Management 
(1%). The top 5 owners of Jardine Matheson Holdings Limited were, in descending 
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order, 1947 Trust (11%), Adam Keswick (11%), Capital Research and Management 
Company (6%), Henry Keswick (3%) and Benjamin Keswick (3%). From this 
simple example, one can get a sense of how Capital IQ has unraveled the convoluted 
ownership loopbacks to aid understanding of the underlying ownership structures. 
Roll-up logic also takes care of pyramidal holdings. Attig (2007) observed that 
presence of family pyramidal holding defuses any potential monitoring benefits of 
board attributes. Pyramidal holdings, for all intents and purposes, act like dual-class 
shares in helping leverage control power over and above actual ownership stakes 
held (Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000)). For example, in 2014, the largest 
investor declared in the annual report of Olam International is Breedens 
Investments Pte Ltd (49%), followed by Citibank Nominees Singapore Pte Ltd 
(19%) and Aranda Investments Pte Ltd (9.36%). In fact, Breedens and Aranda are 
part of the pyramidal chain links through which Temasek Holdings exert ultimate 
ownership and control. If we look at what was reported as the owners of Olam on 
S&P Capital IQ, the top owner is Temasek Holdings (Private) Limited, with the 
stake of the intermediaries rolled-up to the ultimate parent. This standardization by 
Capital IQ facilitates our research greatly. 
In this paper, we will use the four standard measures of centrality as we have 
used in the first part. All firms and owners, be it listed corporations, private firms, 
individuals, family trusts, are nodes in the ownership network. Every node is an 
economic agent. Nodes assume power when they are on more shortest paths 
connecting any other pair of nodes (Betweenness centrality), are closer to all other 
nodes (Closeness centrality), link to more nodes (Degree centrality), or link to nodes 
which are highly linked themselves (Eigenvector centrality). We also use the 
Composite N-score centrality which is a principal-components backed aggregated 
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centrality score (Larcker, et al. (2013)).  
Centrality now is a direct measure of the flow of money and an indirect measure 
of the ability to influence firms. The obvious way owners influence firms would be 
through the nomination and subsequent appointment of directors. Another way an 
owner would be able to influence the firm is if the shareholder is an insider, possibly 
in management. Even if the actual ownership stake may be small, the direct firm 
influence may be disproportionately big. Consistent with the idea that good network 
positions creates opportunities and reduces constraint, an economic actor with high 
ownership centrality would have more bargaining chips in negotiation and jostling 
for specific corporate outcomes (Hanneman and Riddle (2005)). Interestingly, a 
large stakeholder may have the incentive and resources to steer their firms as 
directors, but if they lack expertise, Feldman and Montgomery (2015) suggests that 
such directors might be ineffectual. 
It is difficult to predict ex-ante the effect of high ownership centrality on firm 
performance, even if we adopt a pure ownership perspective on ownership 
centrality. The ownership lens would force us to invoke agency theory. When they 
formulated the theory of the firm, Jensen and Meckling (1976) put agency theory 
at the heart of their treatise.  The agency conflicts that arise from the separation of 
ownership and control in organizations is one that was expounded by Fama and 
Jensen (1983). The tendency of principal-principal conflict would instigate 
expropriation of minority shareholders in favor of large shareholders (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000), Claessens, Fan, Djankov and Lang 
(1999)). However, diffuse ownership may exacerbate agency problems but also 
offer compensating benefits, so the net effect of concentrated ownership is not clear 
(Demsetz and Villalonga (2001)). In other cases though, family ownership, 
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implying high ownership concentration, has shown to be an effective organizational 
structure that does not adversely affect minority shareholders (Anderson and Reeb 
(2003)). Okhmatovskiy (2010) found that firms with board and ownership ties to 
State-owned Enterprises are associated with higher profitability, but firms with 
direct ties to the government are not. Finally, there is a huge body of literature 
regarding the negative effects of excess control rights of the ultimate owner 
(Nenova (2003)). For instance, the cost of borrowing is higher for firms with large 
shareholders who have a divergence between their largest ultimate owner’s control 
rights and cash-flow rights (Lin, Ma, Malatesta and Xuan (2011)). In conclusion, 
the literature is mixed as to whether concentrated ownership drives positive firm 
outcomes, and by extension, for ownership centrality, my prior expectations are not 
biased either way. 
It is difficult also to predict ex-ante which measures of centrality best describes 
and predicts the relationship between ownership centrality and firm performance. 
This is because measures of centrality are highly dependent on the topology of the 
ownership network.  For instance, in a line network of five nodes connected 
sequentially, the central node has the same Degree centrality as its neighbors but 
has higher Closeness and Betweenness centralities.  
Because of the ability of ownership centrality to easily and quickly tease out the 
influence of various economic actors in a reliable and proportionate manner, a 
strongly related strand of literature this work would impact are those research 
looking at the battle between states and corporations – whether state involvement 
crowds out private investment (Choo and Wong (2006), Menon and Ng (2013), Van 
Thang and Freeman (2009)), and whether states embrace the capitalist system with 
the aim of promoting their political goals and furthering their political dominance 
53 
 
(Bremmer (2010)). In such studies, the influence of the state is routinely controlled 
for using dummy variables often depending on the stake of the state. Ownership 
Centrality provides an intuitive systemic mechanism to isolate the effects of the 
state viz-a-viz other economic agents, especially in countries where there is state 
dominance in the capital markets, such as Singapore and China. This new 
methodology would also apply to research looking at specifically the effects of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds on corporate or political outcomes (Dewenter, Han and 
Malatesta (2010)).  
State ownership is often thought to be detrimental to corporate performance. 
Various explanations have been proposed. First, politicians may cause state-owned 
firms to employ excess labor inputs. Second, state-owned firms may be pressured 
to hire politically connected people rather than those best qualified to perform 
desired tasks. Third, state-owned firms forgo maximum profit in the pursuit of 
social and political objectives, such as wealth redistribution. Fourth, the residual 
cashflow claims of these state-owned firms are not readily transferable like the 
shares of a private corporation. State-owned firms have indeed been found to have 
lower accounting-based measures of performance (Dewenter and Malatesta 
(2001)). This “state liability” has been observed for State-owned enterprises who 
exhibit significant performance gaps in terms of profitability and efficiency 
compared to private firms (Lazzarini and Musacchio (2015)). However, in markets 
with emerging capital markets, the results are mixed. In Singapore for instance, Ang 
and Ding (2006) argues that in an emerging economy, the alternative to government 
control is often no governance. They found that Singaporean government-linked 
companies have higher valuations and better Corporate Governance. In China, a 
significant convex relation exists between state ownership and Tobin’s Q of 
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partially privatized state-owned enterprises (Sun, Tong and Tong (2002), Wei, Xie 
and Zhang (2005), Tian and Estrin (2008)). The most understated benefit of state 
ownership could be insurance against black swan events, such as during recessions 
(Lazzarini and Musacchio (2015), Beuselinck, Cao, Deloof and Xia (2015)), or 
targeted attacks by short sellers (Wang (2014)). 
Besides the state, the other large bloc of owners are the institution owners. 
These conglomerates and multi-national companies may or may not be linked to the 
state. Nonetheless, literature is awash with evidence of their impact on firms. 
Whether it is an active influence on CEO compensation (Hartzell and Starks 
(2003)), or passive influence by rebalancing their portfolios (Parrino, Sias and 
Starks (2003)), the impact of institution owners is not trivial. In fact, higher 
percentage stake held by institutions has been found to be associated with higher 
Tobin’s Q (McConnell and Servaes (1990)), but different types of institutions have 
been found to have varying degrees of impact on firm performance, as can be 
expected. Firm performance is enhanced more by foreign and independent 
institutions compared to domestic ones and those perceived to be non-independent 
(Ferreira and Matos (2008)). Firm performance is enhanced by private pension fund 
ownership and undermined by activist fund ownership (Woidtke (2002)).   
Similar to the argument that ownership centrality facilitates a quantitatively 
rigorous algorithmic way to isolate state ownership, the same would go for studies 
that need to invoke group institutional ownership (Claessens, Fan and Lang (2006),  
Carney, Gedajlovic, Heugens, Van Essen and Van Oosterhout (2011)) and 
corporate pyramids (Fan, Wong and Zhang (2013), Chang (2003), Malan, 
Salamudin and Ahmad (2012)). 
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2.1.2    Firm Ownership Network Topology  
The traditional image of ownership of the modern corporation as perpetuated 
by Berle and Means (1932) is one that is with ownership of capital widely dispersed 
among small shareholders. However, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
(1999) tracked down the ownership structure of large corporations in 27 developed 
economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders and found the typical 
firm is more likely being controlled by family dynasties or the state, rather than 
widely dispersed ownership. Holderness, Kroszner and Sheehan (1999) uncovered 
the trend of higher managerial ownership which spiked from 13% in 1935 to 21% 
in 1995. Denis and Sarin (1999) dispelled another myth about the corporation; using 
a sample of 583 firms over the decade starting 1983, they documented that a sizable 
percentage of firms experience large changes in board composition and ownership 
structure in any given year.  The changes appear to be correlated and permanent. 
Using the most comprehensive dataset yet, Faccio and Lang (2002) pored 
through ultimate ownership and control records of 5,232 corporations in 13 Western 
European. They found that the typical firms are family-controlled or widely held. 
Their dataset proves to be very valuable is a widely reused in much subsequent 
research like Laeven and Levine (2008), who found that tradition focus on 
Corporate Finance on the 100% small shareholder firm or the one large blockholder 
firm misses out a huge class of ownership structure, that of multiple blockholders. 
Phan and Yoshikawa (2004) examined the ownership structure for 271 
companies listed on the SGX circa 1999-20000 and found that the median 
proportion of shares owned by block-holders is 63%, relatively high compared to 
Western economies. They note that this stands in stark contrast to countries like 
Japan and Germany. Banks do not directly own significant proportions of shares in 
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Singapore companies because they are not permitted to do so under the Banking 
Act of 1970. 
Vitali, Glattfelder and Battiston (2011) is arguably the first paper to thoroughly 
investigate the architecture of the international corporate ownership network, along 
with the computation of the control held by each global player.  Using the Orbis 
2007 database, the paper mapped out corporate control in the year 2007 across the 
world, involving 37 million economic actors located in 194 countries and roughly 
13 million directed and weighted ownership links. They found that transnational 
corporations form a giant bow-tie structure.  Within this structure, a large portion 
of control flows to a small tightly-knit core of financial institutions. This is the 
general shape of the ownership network on the global scale, but the outcome of their 
analyses is mostly a (very complex) visualization effort. This paper attempts to map 
out a locality in this network and use it to see how it drives outcomes in Corporate 
Finance and Corporate Governance. 
Chapter 2.2    Data and Methodology 
2.2.1    Constructing the Ownership Network  
The concepts of centrality listed in Part I could generally be applied to derive 
ownership centrality, but there are major differences in the network that bears 
highlighting, along with the specific treatment performed in this research. 
First, the interlocking board of directors is a bipartite graph, where each node is 
either a director or a firm, and we could project the graph to either partition. The 
same does not apply to the ownership network graph. The starting nodes are all 
firms, but the owners could be other firms, or private firms, family firms, people, 
or even the state. There is no meaning in partitioning the graph into all its different 
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modes, so in this sense all the nodes are equal; the nodes are all economic agents. 
There is no need for projection of the vertices as was done for the interlocking 
board.  
Second, the ownership network has a natural weightedness edge attribute. As 
opposed to board relationships which have no easily quantifiable measure of 
strength in the relationship, the ownership stake in the firm, on the other hand, is 
conspicuously quantifiable in an accurate manner with ease, a piece of information 
which if disregarded might seem imprudent and unwise. And yet that was one of 
the approaches I have chosen to take. The philosophical retort is the well-worn 
aphorism that “not everything that matters can be measured, and not everything that 
is measured matters”. The logical reason why the unweighted network might work 
is that small shareholders might have an outsized impact on corporate outcomes in 
comparison to larger shareholders. The typical small shareholders who appear on 
the radar of the database are possibly important insiders who have to declare even 
small stakes. Hence, the considered argument for the unweighted network is that it 
tends to err on in favor of the small stakeholders.  In this paper, the unweighted 
ownership network is termed the unity-weighted network, to potentially 
disambiguate mentions of the unweighted interlocking board projections used in 
Part I which I have termed Flat projections. In the same line of thought, the weighted 
ownership network is termed stake-weighted ownership network to avoid confusion 
with the weighted board projection network used in Part I. 
Third, in the interlocking boards framework, most of the board nodes are 
participating in the computation of centrality and involved in the final regressions, 
but not in the case of measuring ownership centrality. In the ownership network, a 
large majority of nodes are little more than placeholders whose absence will not 
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allow us to derive accurate ownership centrality scores. These nodes are disregarded 
in the final analysis, since only the centrality scores of the firms are preserved and 
used in the analyses. 
Lastly, a word about directedness in the ownership network.  The ownership tie 
implies a certain flow of power, influence, and literal cash. Ownership of a firm 
implies a stake in the residual claim of the firm, and operationally this translates to 
literal cashflow such as in the case of dividend payouts. There are many 
documented ways of deriving centrality measures in the case where directedness is 
a feature of the graph, such as using hubs and authority as developed in Kleinberg 
(1999).  The most famous example centrality algorithm, however, must be the 
PageRank algorithm, conceived by Brin and Page (1998), whose simplicity belies 
the elegance with which it distilled the essence of the very convoluted directed 
graph of hyperlinks and helped create one of the most valuable companies in the 
world. In our paper, we ignore directedness to no severe consequence. My 
conjecture as to why directedness could be safely ignored is because of roll-up logic 
at the database level, where eventual owners are identified almost immediately, 
making proper directional tracing of ownerships through convoluted ownership 
paths unimportant. 
2.2.2    Firm Ownership Data 
There is a plethora of company ownership information available in other 
databases, but they do not handle the combination of a list of companies and 
historical data as easily as S&P Capital IQ.  
Formerly known as Spectrum, Thomson Reuters Insider Filing Data (Forms 3, 
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4, 5, and 144) goes back to 19786.  Unfortunately, Thomson Reuter’s data from 
WRDS has data only for U.S. companies. Bloomberg is good for the ownership of 
single company analysis. Thomson One Worldscope has detailed ownership for 
worldwide companies but with restrictions on the number of companies that can be 
investigated at one time, and results often need significant reformatting. Fame is 
good for British and Irish companies, and Amadeus for large European companies.  
S&P Capital IQ’s detailed ownership data enables users to view a public 
company's latest shareholder base, historical ownership changes for up to five years, 
and insider transactions for up to two years. Ownership data is mainly sourced from 
annual reports and shareholder proxy statements. These documents are annual, so 
by its nature, the predominant share of ownership is going to be updated annually. 
A substantial shareowner needs to file a notification when the entity crosses a 
certain percentage of ownership. 
In Singapore, the relevant legislation covering substantial shareholding 
disclosure are the Companies Act, the Securities and Futures Act, and the Business 
Trust Act. The legislation applies to all Singapore-listed corporations, REITs, and 
business trusts.  
Substantial Holdings refers to interest in 5% or more of the voting shares or 
units.  The reporting obligation kicks in upon becoming or ceasing to be a 
substantial shareholder or changes in percentage shareholdings at discrete levels of 
1% within two business days of triggering event. 
Interest can be direct or deemed.  Interest is deemed when there is control or 
exercise rights of more than or equal to 20% through itself, its associates or together 
                                                
6 A cleansed version is available only back to 1986. Institutional (Form 13F) and 5 Percent Owner 
Databases go back to 1980; the Domestic Mutual Fund Database goes back to 1979 
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with associates.  However, holding as bare trustee, holding by way of security in 
connection with a lending entered into in the ordinary course of business, and 
holding by reason of a prescribed office, are not deemed interests. 
One peculiarity of the database is that Total Shares Outstanding can exceed 
100% because reporting requirements for holdings data are not aligned with the 
financials reporting of shares outstanding. Below we provide further elucidation on 
the other unique characteristics of the S&P Capital IQ ownership database which 
bear mentioning. 
A few documents may report shareholdings for a particular holder with actual 
holders or associated entities of it, which leads to a difference in the holdings 
available over the platform and that of source documents. S&P Capital IQ employs 
certain mechanism at the collection level that defines which holders could be 
considered as an Actual holder in cases where source document reports multiple 
holders for the same holdings. 
One mechanism is “Roll-Up Logic”. In most of the cases, filings like Annual 
Reports or Exchange Announcements are inconsistent in different periods, meaning 
different entities in the same corporate family tree report for the same ownership 
positions in a public company. For example, a stock exchange filing may list JP 
Morgan (Suisse) SA as an owner, but an annual report may show similar shares 
with simply JP Morgan Chase & Company Inc. Often the ultimate parent of the 
owner reports for shares held by their subsidiaries. In case both the parent and child 
own, then the data vendor does not consistently get a break-down of the shares held 
by parent and subsidiary across periods. If all filings are kept at the actual reporting 
entity, then they would often end up counting the shares twice and duplicate 
ownership positions on the platform. Looking at the inconsistency in filings, S&P 
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Capital IQ devised a roll-up logic at backend that leverages the relationships 
amongst the entities in the same corporate family tree or vertical and shows the 
ultimate parent company as the owner of the shares.  
In cases where reported holdings are given with some footnotes or additional 
information, S&P Capital IQ may perform certain adjustments based on the given 
footnotes at the collection level. Hence, a difference in reported holdings (without 
any adjustments done) given in the source document when compared to the platform 
(post adjusted holdings) is bound to happen. S&P Capital IQ makes all the 
necessary adjustments to keep the data in sync right from the history. These 
adjustments (add ups/deductions) could be of various nature, viz. based on given 
document, previously filled documents, additional information provided elsewhere, 
and so on. 
S&P Capital IQ also performs consolidation of Direct and Indirect Positions 
when they come across the documents which report either the direct holdings or at 
times only indirect holdings or even family/trust holdings. While collecting the 
reported data, they try to ensure that the current holdings are in sync with previously 
collected holdings or are there any missing holdings available in other documents. 
Hence, consolidation of all these direct/indirect reported holdings needs to be done 
to show consistent data over the platform.  Hence there would be a deviation 
between platform holdings and reported holdings in the document as holdings 
appearing over platform are the full holdings of a particular entity since it has been 
adjusted effectively. 
2.2.3    Ownership Centrality 
One constraint of ownership controls in standard Corporate Finance literature 
is that normally only the ultimate owner of the firm can be included in the 
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regressions, regardless of the pattern of ownership. One advantage of using 
centrality to assess the impact of stakeholdings in companies is that not only the 
ultimate owner is assessed, but the distribution of owners is considered in the 
computation of the final centrality score of the firm. 
As an example, I present in the Table below the list of entities with top stake-
weighted Eigenvector centralities for the Year 2014. It can be observed that the top 
entities are not limited to Public Listed firms. In fact, the top entity is Temasek 
Holdings (Private) Limited, a state-owned holding company that is a sovereign 
wealth fund owned by the Government of Singapore. 
List	of	Top	10	stake-weighted	Eigenvector	Centralities	for	2014	
Temasek	Holdings	(Private)	Limited	
Singapore	Airlines	Limited	
Neptune	Orient	Lines	Limited	
Olam	International	Limited	
Sembcorp	Industries	Ltd	
SMRT	Corporation	Ltd	
Singapore	Telecommunications	Limited	
Singapore	Technologies	Engineering	Ltd	
SATS	Ltd	
CapitaLand	Limited	
 
Centrality scores are computed for all owner entities, regardless of whether they 
are actual persons, family trusts, publicly listed firms or private corporations. In this 
way, Temasek’s high Eigenvector centrality would translate into higher eigenvector 
centrality scores for all entities that it owns, and through this mechanism, we have 
a proxy for the transmission of information, command, and control between all the 
entities in our ownership model.  
Note that this result is peculiar to this ownership network and is not present in 
the network of interlocking boards. First, the Temasek board is not included as a 
board node because it is not listed. Second, the highest level of management, 
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specifically the CEOs of Temasek Holdings and Temasek International, are not 
personally on the boards of Singapore listed companies. Temasek’s presence must 
instead be felt through an army of nominated directors, who under the interlocking 
boards framework, are not algorithmically recognized as part of a super-entity. 
The list for top 10 entities with highest unity-weighted Eigenvector centralities 
is shown below. Temasek is not on this list because in this list the magnitude of 
shareholdings is diluted to a binary relationship. A non-domestic entity, Prudential 
plc, appears on this list. 
List	of	Top	10	unity-weighted	Eigenvector	Centralities	for	2014	
Keppel	Corporation	Limited		
DBS	Group	Holdings	Ltd	
Singapore	Telecommunications	Limited	
United	Overseas	Bank	Limited	
Prudential	plc	
CapitaLand	Limited	
Oversea	Chinese	Banking	Corporation	Limited	
Global	Logistic	Properties	Limited	
Sembcorp	Industries	Ltd	
ComfortDelGro	Corporation	Limited	
 
According to listing rules of the SGX, complete ownership data is normally 
published except in the annual report, which would have a section listing the twenty 
largest shareholders, a section that is mostly cosmetic because it is commonly filled 
by brokerages under Nominee entities. The listing rules also mandate that in the 
annual report the names of the substantial shareholders and a breakdown of their 
direct and deemed interests be reported as shown in the company's Register of 
Substantial Shareholders. For deemed interests, the issuer must disclose how such 
interests are held or derived. The notifiable obligation for the substantial 
shareholder is typically 5%. In addition, since the Securities and Futures 
(Amendment) Act provides for disclosure of any interests in securities of a 
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Singapore incorporated company by its directors and whosoever irrespective of his 
corporate title, it is principally responsible for the management and conduct of 
business of that listed corporation. Hence through this way, our ownership network, 
especially under the unity-weighted case, would capture the influence of insider 
directors even though directors are not explicitly included. 
2.2.4    Firm Performance and Control Variables 
For the sake of completeness, a table of variable definitions is provided in Table 
II.A.  Most of the variables used in Part II, in fact, overlaps significantly with those 
in Part I.  
The only exception is the stake variable, which is the percentage shareholdings 
of the ultimate shareholder with the largest ownership stake. This variable is added 
as a control variable because the key independent variable tested in this Part have 
an understandably intricate relationship with the shareholdings of the ultimate 
owner and we want to disentangle these effects from the ownership centrality 
effects. 
Chapter 2.3    Hypothesis Development 
The first hypothesis of this part research is to test the idea that firms that are 
more central to the ownership network achieve better return-on-assets and Tobin’s 
Q, using a simple interpretation of ownership without consideration to 
directionality. This hypothesis is based on the idea that the network of owners is 
also a network of influence and cashflow and is a good proxy for proxy for owners 
and their collective impact on multiple firms through their ties 
H1: Firms with higher ownership centralities have better firm 
performance  
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The second hypothesis is that if H1 holds, such ownership effects should persist 
for the medium-term window of 2 to 4 years. This is an extension of the idea that 
while ownership distribution changes very frequently for a firm at the micro level, 
at the firm level huge changes to ownership centrality are less often observed and 
hence the impact of today’s firm ownership centrality would impact the firm up to 
four years. 
H2: Firms with higher ownership centralities have better firm 
performance in the medium term 
The third hypothesis we test in this paper is that consideration of the 
weightedness of the ownership network is important yet unclear. On the one hand, 
a stake-weighted network would overstate the effects of large blockholders. On the 
other hand, a unity-weighted network would overstate the contribution of small 
shareholders. It is conceivable that we get varied results based on the type of 
network weighting scheme used. However, it is expected that a Stake-weighted 
network would dilute the effects of Degree centrality and its closely associated 
measure Eigenvector centrality.  
H3: Stake-weighted ownership networks should yield stronger results for 
geodesic-based centrality measures like Betweenness and Closeness 
centrality, while Unity-weighted ownership network should yield better 
results for Degree centrality and its derivative Eigenvector centrality 
Chapter 2.4    Analysis and Results  
2.4.1    Network Statistics 
Table II.2 shows the Ownership Network graph statistics. The sample period 
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for ownership centrality of 11 years is shorter than that of Board connectedness 
because of data availability on Capital IQ. 
Panel II.2A presents the general graph statistics. The number of nodes in the 
network graph for each year varies from a low of 3,400 in 2004 to 9,866 in 2014. 
Since Unity-weighted is shorthand for edge weights having a value of one for all 
edges, the graph size for the unity weighted case is equal to the number of edges in 
the graph. So, taking reference at the year 2004, the number of edges in the graph 
is 9,272 but the total sum of all edge weights, otherwise known as the graph size, is 
1,486,092.  
Panel II.2B presents the graph components. It is interesting to note the 
dispersion to form a sense of the graph topology. Note that singletons (graph 
components with one node) are omitted in the listing of components. It can be 
observed that there is as a rule a very large component, which is many orders of 
magnitude larger than the next largest component. This is a different topology 
compared to that of the board projection or the director projection graph networks. 
Inspecting the network closer would reveal that year 2004 was probably a year with 
insufficient data coverage as it stands out as having many islands in the network 
graph. 
2.4.2    Summary Statistics 
The summary statistics are presented in Table II.3.  
Panel II.3A repeats most of what was discussed in Part I. A new control variable 
is added in this section, which is the percentage stake owned by the largest 
shareholder. As mentioned, within the Capital IQ database Total Shares 
Outstanding can exceed 100% because reporting requirements for holdings data are 
not aligned with the financials reporting of shares outstanding, and this would also 
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affect the variable of the stake held by the largest shareholder. 
Panel II.3B describes the descriptive statistics of the variables obtained from a 
unity-weighted ownership graph, and Panel II.3C presents the network variables 
obtained under a stake-weighted ownership network graph. The measures for 
Betweenness, Closeness, and Eigenvector have been normalized to the size of the 
graph for better comparability across graphs (different years). However, degree 
centrality has not been normalized, because the unadjusted degree is intuitive and 
easy to interpret. 
2.4.3    Correlation Matrices 
Table II.4 displays the Pearson correlation matrices between the main 
regression variables and the network centrality measures.  
Panel II.4A is the table for Unity-weighted network centralities, while Panel 
II.4B is the counterpart for Stake-weighted network centralities. It is observed that 
all the centralities are positively correlated with one another, with the highest 
correlation between Degree centrality and N-score Composite centrality of 0.86 in 
the case of Unity-weighted, and Betweenness and N-score Composite centrality of 
0.72 in the case of Stake-weighted. 
The correlations between return-on-assets and Tobin’s Q and the various 
centrality measures are unambiguously positive and significant.  The only exception 
is Stake Eigenvector centrality, which shows insignificant correlation with return-
on-assets. 
2.4.4    Differences in Means  
Table II.5 presents the differences in means of the ownership centrality 
measures in relation to the two main corporate performance measures used in this 
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paper. 
An examination of Panel II.5A shows that Betweenness under Unity-weighted 
networks has only a 10% significance for return-on-assets, while Closeness is 
insignificant. These results are not surprising considering that the correlational 
analysis for these two variables only has 5% significance while the other variables 
mostly had 1%. Besides these two cases, all the other centrality variables in Panel 
II.5A have significant t-tests that suggest higher centralities is associated strongly 
with higher corporate performance. 
Panel II.5B show that all the stake-weighted derived centralities have significant 
t-tests for our firm performance response variables between the higher and lower 
centralities divided along the median. The only exception is stake-weighted 
eigenvector centrality, whose effect on return-on-assets is insignificant from zero, 
a result foreboded by the earlier correlation analysis. 
2.4.5    Firm Performance and Ownership Centralities 
Table II.6 presents the table of regressions for firm performance and various 
ownership centralities. It is split into four panels, with Panels II.6Ai and ii based on 
unity-weighted centrality measures and Panels II.6Bi and ii based on stake-
weighted ones. 
2.4.5.1    ROA on Unity-weighted Ownership Centralities 
Panel II.6Ai presents the relationship between return-on-assets and ownership 
centralities derived under Unity-weighted networks.  
Equations (1) to (5) are the univariate regressions, which show that all except 
closeness are positive and significant at the 1% level.  
Equations (6) to (10) are the respective multivariate regressions. One control 
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variable that is added to the lineup of firm controls is the stake held by the largest 
stakeholder of the firm, which is expected to have an impact on firm returns, and is 
added here to ensure that the effect of our new ownership centralities variable on 
firm performance is not duplicitous with the stake variable. 
These results confirm the results obtained in the univariate regressions. The 
Betweenness and Degree coefficients are positive and highly significant at 1%, 
while eigenvector is positive and significant at 5%.  
These highly promising and groundbreaking results prove that ownership 
centrality is a valid factor in the case of return-on-assets. It also raises some 
questions, such as the weakness of Closeness centrality factor, which is not 
anticipated.  
2.4.5.2    Tobin’s Q on Unity-weighted Ownership Centralities 
Panel II.6Aii presents the relationship between Tobin’s Q and ownership 
centralities derived under Unity-weighted networks. 
For the univariate regressions, Equations (1) to (2), we observe that 
Betweenness and Closeness lose their significance compared to simple t-test result, 
and the significance is completely obliterated in the multivariate case in equations 
(6) and (7). 
Degree, Eigenvector and Composite N-score centralities, on the other hand, 
show up as highly significant at 1% in the univariate regressions in equations (3) to 
(5), and the significance tapes slightly only in the multivariate case as seen in 
equations (9) and (10). 
All the significant coefficients (and in fact, the insignificant coefficients too) 
are positive, which is the right direction of influence we expect of their impact on 
Tobin’s Q. 
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These cursory results show that ownership centrality might be useful in 
prediction of Tobin’s Q. However, Betweenness and Closeness does not seem to 
work, only Degree, Eigenvector, and N-score centralities do. 
2.4.5.3    ROA on Stake-weighted Ownership Centralities 
Panel II.6Bi presents the relationship between return-on-assets and ownership 
centralities derived under Stake-weighted networks. 
Equations (1) to (5) show the univariate regressions, which all have positive and 
highly significant coefficients at 1% level, except for Eigenvector centrality. Upon 
including the set of control variables, we can see in equations (6) to (10) that 
Eigenvector centrality is still insignificant, while Degree centrality has lost its 
significance.  
This last result is understandable, because among all the centralities that we 
have included in this study, the one that is most correlated with the percentage 
shareholdings of the ultimate owner would be stake weighted Degree centrality with 
a correlation of 0.53. It is therefore not surprising that Degree centrality becomes 
obsolete once we control for the ownership stake of the ultimate shareholder. 
2.4.5.4    Tobin’s Q on Stake-weighted Ownership Centralities 
Panel II.6Bii presents the relationship between Tobin’s Q and ownership 
centralities derived under Stake-weighted networks. 
As with the differences-in-means test, the univariate regressions are promising, 
as reported in equations (1) to (5), with all the centrality coefficients being positive 
and significant at the 1% level. For multivariate regressions, as reported in 
equations (6) to (10), Closeness and N-score composite centrality retained their 1% 
significance. Degree and Eigenvector dropped to 5% significance. Betweenness 
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dropped to 10% significance. 
2.4.6    Future Firm Performance and Composite Ownership Centralities 
Table II.7 presents the table of regressions for future firm performance and N-
score composite ownership centralities. It is split into four panels, with Panels 
II.7Ai and ii based on unity-weighted centrality measures and Panels II.7Bi and ii 
based on stake-weighted ones. 
The reason N-score centrality was chosen as the key centrality variable in this 
section is that after analyzing the results presented in Table II.6, it appears that the 
N-Score variant is the consistent performer of all the centrality variables used, 
whether in terms of return-on-assets or Tobin’s Q. 
2.4.6.1    Future ROA on Unity-weighted Ownership Centralities 
Panel II.7Ai presents the relationship between future return-on-assets and 
composite N-score ownership centrality derived under Unity-weighted networks.  
Note that all the centrality coefficients are positive. Equations (1) and (2) are 
for contemporaneous regressions presented for ease of comparison. Equations (3) 
to (10) are the look-ahead regressions. It can be noted that all the coefficients on 
the N-score centralities are highly significant at the 1% level whether it be the 
univariate or the multivariate regressions. The only regression showing 5% 
significance for the centrality coefficient is that for three-year look-ahead return-
on-assets. 
2.4.6.2    Future Tobin’s Q on Unity-weighted Ownership Centralities 
Panel II.7Aii presents the relationship between future Tobin’s Q and composite 
N-score ownership centrality derived under Unity-weighted networks. 
Note that all the centrality coefficients are positive. Equations (1) and (2) are 
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for contemporaneous regressions presented for ease of comparison. Equations (3) 
to (10) are the look-ahead regressions. Equation (4) is the multivariate look-ahead 
Tobin’s Q regression with the best result, which is what we saw in Panel II.6Aii 
(10). It appears that N-score centrality loses its explanatory powers when extended 
to time horizons longer than one year. 
2.4.6.3    Future ROA on Stake-weighted Ownership Centralities 
Panel II.7Bi presents the relationship between future return-on-assets and 
composite N-score ownership centrality derived under Stake-weighted networks. 
Note that all the centrality coefficients are positive. When we compare the Stake 
weighted results here against the Unity-weighted results obtained in Panel II.7Ai, 
we can see that the results for Stake-weighted N-score centrality are stronger under 
the stake-weighted case.  
2.4.6.4    Future Tobin’s Q on Stake-weighted Ownership Centralities 
Panel II.7Bii presents the relationship between future Tobin’s Q and composite 
N-score ownership centrality derived under Stake-weighted networks. 
Note once again that all the centrality coefficients are positive. When we 
compare the Stake weighted results here against the Unity-weighted results 
obtained in Panel II.7Aii, note that the results for look-ahead multivariate 
regressions are better or at least as good in the Stake-weighted case. 
Chapter 2.5    Robustness Checks 
Table II.8 does robustness checks on the regression results in the earlier chapter, 
by using the subsample of firms with SCGI scores. Panel II.8Ai presents the table 
of regressions for firm performance and ownership centralities based on unity-
weighted centrality measures, controlled for Corporate Governance. Panel II.8Bi 
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and ii presents the table of regressions for firm performance and ownership 
centralities based on stake-weighted centrality measures, controlled for Corporate 
Governance.  
2.5.1    Corporate Governance and Unity-weighted Ownership Centralities 
2.5.1.1    ROA and Unity-weighted Ownership Centralities 
Panel II.8Ai (1) to (5) presents the relationship between return-on-assets and 
ownership centralities derived under Unity-weighted networks with Corporate 
Governance control and could be compared to Panel II.6Ai. 
From the results, we can conclude that the general results are robust under 
controlling for Corporate Governance. Betweenness and Degree centralities 
retained their 1% significance, whereas Eigenvector and N-score centralities are 
slightly less significant, being at the 5% level. 
2.5.1.2    Tobin’s Q and Unity-weighted Ownership Centralities 
Panel II.8Ai (6) to (10) presents the relationship between Tobin’s Q and 
ownership centralities derived under Unity-weighted networks with Corporate 
Governance control and could be compared to Panel II.6Aii. 
The results are unequivocal that none of the centrality measures are significant 
when Corporate Governance is accounted for. This result is unexpected, and imply 
that Corporate Governance scores from the SCGI control for the factors that 
centrality scores capture at least when in explaining variance in Tobin’s Q.  
2.5.1.3    Future ROA and Unity-weighted Composite Centrality 
Panel II.8Aii (1) to (5) presents the relationship between return-on-assets and 
ownership centralities derived under Stake-weighted networks with Corporate 
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Governance control and could be compared to Panel II.7Ai. 
It can be seen from equations (2) to (5) that N-score centrality is significant at 
the 5% level at least when accounting for the variance in look-ahead return-on-
assets. The significance level of centrality coefficients for the one-year and two-
year look-ahead cases dropped from the 1% level of significance to 5%. 
2.5.1.4    Future Tobin’s Q and Unity-weighted Composite Centrality 
Panel II.8Aii (6) to (10) presents the relationship between Tobin’s Q and 
ownership centralities derived under Stake-weighted networks with Corporate 
Governance control and could be compared to Panel II.7Aii. 
Pursuant to the results of Panel II.8Ai (6) to (10), we see that the centrality 
measure has lost its explanatory linkage for all look-ahead Tobin’s Q tested. 
2.5.2    Corporate Governance and Stake-weighted Ownership Centralities 
2.5.2.1    ROA and Stake-weighted Ownership Centralities 
Panel II.8Bi (1) to (5) presents the relationship between future return-on-assets 
and composite N-score ownership centrality derived under Unity-weighted 
networks with Corporate Governance control and could be compared to Panel 
II.6Bi.  
The direction and the significance of the coefficients on the centralities are 
unchanged, making this panel the one which best survives the Corporate 
Governance robustness check. Betweenness, Closeness and N-score composite 
centralities are positively significant at the 1% level. 
2.5.2.2    Tobin’s Q and Stake-weighted Ownership Centralities 
Panel II.8Bi (6) to (10) presents the relationship between future Tobin’s Q and 
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composite N-score ownership centrality derived under Unity-weighted networks 
with Corporate Governance control and could be compared to Panel II.6Bii. 
None of the coefficients are significant, meaning that stake-weighted centrality 
does not survive the Corporate Governance robustness test. This is in line with the 
earlier results achieved under the unity-weighted case. 
2.5.2.3    Future ROA and Stake-weighted Composite Centrality 
Panel II.8Bii (1) to (5) presents the relationship between future return-on-assets 
and composite N-score ownership centrality derived under Stake-weighted 
networks with Corporate Governance control and could be compared to Panel 
II.7Bi. 
It can be noted that all the results for the look-ahead effects of stake-weighted 
composite centrality on return-on-assets survived the robustness checks and are 
positive and significant at the 1% level. The only exception is the two-year look-
ahead, whose coefficient less significant, at the 10% level. 
2.5.2.4    Future Tobin’s Q and Stake-weighted Composite Centrality 
Panel II.8Bii (6) to (10) presents the relationship between future Tobin’s Q and 
composite N-score ownership centrality derived under Stake-weighted networks 
with Corporate Governance control and could be compared to Panel II.7Bii. 
As expected by now, none of the stake-weighted composite centralities were 
significant for look-ahead Tobin’s Q after controlling for Corporate Governance.  
Chapter 2.6    Conclusion 
This paper also provides a holistic view of how ownership centrality interact 
with classical Corporate Governance measures. Relying heavily on the prior 
Corporate Governance scorecard developed for the Singapore market by Goh and 
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Lee (2009), this paper showed that certain centrality measures may capture 
additional dimensions that are hitherto omitted from the scorecard approach used 
in classical Corporate Governance indices.  
It is ground-breaking to report that ownership centralities are a valid method to 
analyze hitherto unanalyzed social network metrics of corporate ownership. The 
centrality measures get mixed results when controlled for Corporate Governance, 
and the most robust metric turns out to be the N-Score centrality measure defined 
in  Larcker, et al. (2013), on the return-on-assets measure of Corporate 
Performance.  
In reaching the conclusion that neither unity-weighted or stake-weighted is 
superior, I received some feedback that this conclusion is not satisfying and more 
should be done to crown a winner to guide future research towards a superior 
method. To this criticism, I would like to point to another star-crossed lover-pair of 
methodologies in Empirical Finance – the equally-weighted and value-weighted 
portfolio or index. It is taken for granted that both have their place for there are 
distinct advantages to both methods and one is not a subset of the other. In the same 
vein, I would like to suggest that future research be conducted into both unity and 
stake-weighted methods because they capture different dimensions of the 
ownership network.  
In this paper, I ran a wide battery of tests to map out the terrain on ownership 
networks and its effects on corporate performance and governance. There is 
conceivably a great deal of future research that could be built on top of ownership 
networks. Firstly, the directedness of the network is something which has not been 
exploited. With a directed network, powerful network algorithms like PageRank 
(Brin and Page (1998)) could be performed. Second, the ownership centrality could 
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be a more sophisticated way to replace traditional dummy ownership variables used 
like in the case of research in Singapore where Temasek dummy variable is invoked 
(Li (2016), Liu, Yap and Zhou (2016)). Stake-owned centrality may be a more 
intuitive and elegant way to achieve some of the same outcomes. Third, ownership 
centrality could be used as a variable, instrument or proxy to disentangle control 
rights versus cashflow rights of various owners. Using a proxy measure known as 
the Banzhaf Index, arguably we can further examine whether the control versus 
cashflow rights of the ultimate owner of the firm has any effects on firm 
performance. Fourth, it would be useful to extend the ownership database to include 
boards of private firms, where possible, and of public organizations.  This would be 
important especially in the case of Singapore where the state has a larger than 
normal influence in the corporate world. A board member who is concurrently 
straddling government and corporate responsibilities is conceivably a valuable 
connection, a valuable link which is currently absent in the current dataset.   
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Appendix for Part 1 
 
Table I.1 Variable List 
Panel I.1A Board Network Variables 
Abbreviation Variable Name Description and Remarks 
Fb Flat Betweenness  Node Betweenness Centrality Score for 
Unweighted Flat Projection 
Fc Flat Closeness  Node Closeness Centrality Score for 
Unweighted Flat Projection 
Fd Flat Degree Node Degree for Unweighted Flat Projection 
Fe Flat Eigenvector  Node Eigenvector Centrality Score for 
Unweighted Flat Projection 
Fnq Flat Composite 
(Quintile) 
Quintile Composite Centrality Score for 
Unweighted Flat Projection 
Fbq, Fcq, 
Fdq, Feq 
Flat Centrality 
(Quintile) 
Quintile for Betweenness, Closeness, Degree or 
Eigenvector centrality for Unweighted Flat 
Projection 
   
Wb Weighted 
Betweenness  
Node Betweenness Centrality Score for Simple 
Weighted Projection 
Wc Weighted Closeness  Node Closeness Centrality Score for Simple 
Weighted Projection 
Wd Weighted Degree Node Degree for Simple Weighted Projection 
We Weighted 
Eigenvector  
Node Eigenvector Centrality Score for Simple 
Weighted Projection 
Wnq Weighted Composite 
(Quintile) 
Quintile Composite Centrality Score for Simple 
Weighted Projection 
Wbq, Wcq, 
Wdq, Weq 
Weighted Centrality 
(Quintile) 
Quintile for Betweenness, Closeness, Degree or 
Eigenvector centrality for Simple Weighted 
Projection 
   
Cb Collaboration 
Betweenness  
Node Betweenness Centrality Score for 
Collaboration Projection 
Cc Collaboration 
Closeness  
Node Closeness Centrality Score for 
Collaboration Projection 
Cd Collaboration Degree Node Degree for Collaboration Projection 
Ce Collaboration 
Eigenvector  
Node Eigenvector Centrality Score for 
Collaboration Projection 
Cn Collaboration 
Composite (Quintile) 
Quintile Composite Centrality Score for 
Collaboration Projection 
Cbq, Ccq, 
Cdq, Ceq 
Collaboration 
Centrality (Quintile) 
Quintile for Betweenness, Closeness, Degree or 
Eigenvector centrality for Collaboration 
Projection 
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Panel I.1B Firm Variables 
Abbreviation Variable Name Description and Remarks 
roa, roa1, 
roa2, roa3, 
roa4 
Return-on-assets Return-on-assets of the firm. The suffix, if 
present, indicates the look-ahead number of 
years. 
tq, tq1, tq2, 
tq3, tq4, tq5 
Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q of the firm. The suffix, if present, 
indicates the look-ahead number of years. 
quickratio Quick Ratio Contemporaneous quick ratio of the firm.  
netsales Net Sales Net Sales (in log) of the firm in USD.  
sgata SG&A to Assets Percentage of Selling, General and Admin 
expense over the total assets of the firm 
leverage Leverage The leverage level of the firm, defined as the 
ratio of total debt over total assets 
assetgrowth Asset Growth Asset growth rate of the firm 
age Firm Age The age of the firm since its founding. 
hhi_ta Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index 
This measures industry concentration at the 
Fama-French 30 industry portfolio based on 
total assets.   
ffi10  The Fama-French 10 Industry Portfolios, 
namely: 
1. Consumer NonDurables 
2. Consumer Durables 
3. Manufacturing 
4. Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and 
Products 
5. Business Equipment 
6. Telephone and Television Transmission 
7. Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 
(Laundries, Repair Shops) 
8. Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and 
Drugs 
9. Utilities 
10. Other 
scgi Singapore Corporate 
Governance Index 
Value weighted score of the firm on the 
Singapore Corporate Governance Index 
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Table I.2. Board Network Graph Statistics
Panel I.2A. General Graph Statistics
 Graph Size (Sum of all edge weights)
Year Nodes CollabBoard FlatBoard WeightedBoard
1989 181 31 64 92
1990 201 37 68 101
1991 211 43 75 117
1992 230 52 105 149
1993 247 62 128 174
1994 275 70 141 189
1995 290 78 160 211
1996 319 83 164 217
1997 356 110 206 266
1998 383 130 239 305
1999 425 175 323 406
2000 480 244 472 567
2001 510 296 621 726
2002 547 388 864 1,007
2003 608 500 1,234 1,416
2004 698 630 1,606 1,815
2005 737 748 1,960 2,207
2006 789 834 2,191 2,469
2007 837 938 2,432 2,718
2008 864 962 2,510 2,795
2009 869 1,006 2,608 2,909
2010 894 1,046 2,662 2,969
2011 904 1,072 2,688 3,003
2012 922 1,104 2,706 3,056
2013 935 1,165 2,872 3,239
2014 946 1,176 2,824 3,180
2015 945 1,180 2,834 3,181
2016 942 1,134 2,602 2,948
Panel I.2B. Graph Components
Year #Components Components (Singletons omited)
1989 154 [11, 5, 5, 4, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
1990 171 [11, 5, 5, 4, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
1991 177 [11, 6, 5, 5, 4, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
1992 186 [15, 10, 5, 5, 4, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
1993 194 [19, 17, 5, 5, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
1994 216 [20, 18, 8, 5, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
1995 222 [23, 18, 8, 7, 4, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
1996 248 [23, 18, 8, 7, 5, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
1997 260 [32, 27, 8, 7, 4, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
1998 266 [65, 8, 7, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
1999 267 [98, 15, 8, 8, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2000 251 [170, 8, 6, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2001 234 [224, 8, 7, 6, 5, 5, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2002 209 [317, 5, 5, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2003 197 [392, 6, 4, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2004 192 [500, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2005 167 [564, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2006 175 [607, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2]
2007 145 [681, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2008 154 [701, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2009 128 [735, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2010 130 [752, 6, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2011 127 [762, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2012 121 [785, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2013 111 [813, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2014 107 [825, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2015 110 [824, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2016 124 [807, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
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Panel I.2C. Director Projection Network Statistics
 Graph Size (Sum of all edge weights)
Year Nodes CollabDir FlatDir WeightedDir
1989 323 144 289 308
1990 370 170 345 369
1991 411 196 418 450
1992 457 224 501 535
1993 517 260 643 679
1994 618 312 881 920
1995 687 353 1,060 1,102
1996 773 394 1,207 1,254
1997 903 475 1,537 1,599
1998 990 533 1,753 1,821
1999 1,161 649 2,261 2,375
2000 1,389 808 3,013 3,146
2001 1,568 936 3,715 3,868
2002 1,851 1,146 5,048 5,274
2003 2,222 1,412 6,797 7,088
2004 2,656 1,720 8,761 9,090
2005 3,008 1,984 10,997 11,369
2006 3,326 2,200 12,716 13,138
2007 3,714 2,462 14,753 15,196
2008 3,862 2,557 15,069 15,503
2009 3,945 2,631 15,558 16,021
2010 4,135 2,748 16,692 17,157
2011 4,237 2,818 17,158 17,607
2012 4,384 2,916 18,038 18,551
2013 4,487 3,010 18,907 19,495
2014 4,603 3,072 19,258 19,827
2015 4,631 3,089 19,392 19,926
2016 4,533 3,003 18,323 18,870
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Panel I.2D. Director Projection Network Graph Components
Year #Components Components (Singletons omited)
1989 154 [20, 8, 8, 7, 6, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 
2, 2, 2, 2]
1990 171 [21, 9, 9, 8, 7, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 
3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
1991 177 [23, 13, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 
3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
1992 186 [27, 14, 14, 11, 10, 7, 6, 6, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 
3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
1993 194 [43, 35, 11, 10, 7, 7, 6, 6, 6, 6, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 
3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 
2, 2, 2, 2]
1994 216 [50, 41, 21, 15, 11, 8, 8, 7, 7, 7, 6, 6, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 
4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
1995 222 [66, 46, 23, 21, 19, 11, 8, 8, 8, 7, 7, 6, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 
4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 
3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
1996 248 [68, 46, 24, 23, 22, 11, 10, 8, 8, 8, 7, 7, 6, 6, 6, 6, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 
4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 
3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
1997 260 [90, 84, 30, 26, 18, 12, 10, 10, 9, 8, 8, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 
5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 
3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
1998 266 [190, 32, 27, 18, 15, 12, 11, 10, 10, 10, 9, 9, 8, 8, 8, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 
5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 
3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
1999 267 [288, 67, 28, 28, 15, 12, 11, 11, 11, 10, 10, 9, 9, 9, 8, 8, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 
5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 
3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 
3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 
2, 2, 2, 2]
2000 251 [548, 31, 15, 15, 14, 13, 13, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 11, 11, 11, 10, 10, 9, 9, 9, 8, 8, 8, 7, 7, 7, 7, 6, 6, 6, 
6, 6, 6, 6, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 
4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 
3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2001 234 [757, 32, 22, 19, 18, 15, 14, 13, 13, 12, 12, 11, 11, 10, 10, 9, 9, 9, 9, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 6, 6, 6, 6, 5, 5, 5, 
5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 
4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 
3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2002 209 [1184, 21, 18, 15, 13, 11, 11, 11, 9, 9, 8, 8, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 
5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 
3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 
2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
97 
 
 
Panel I.2D. Director Projection Network Graph Components (cont'd)
Year #Components Components (Singletons omited)
2003 197 [1540, 22, 18, 16, 13, 11, 11, 10, 9, 9, 9, 8, 8, 8, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 
6, 6, 6, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 
3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2004 192 [2011, 16, 16, 14, 13, 12, 11, 9, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 
5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 
3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2005 167 [2383, 18, 14, 13, 12, 12, 10, 9, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 
6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 
3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2006 175 [2678, 19, 16, 14, 14, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 9, 8, 8, 8, 8, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 
6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 
4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2007 145 [3135, 15, 15, 14, 14, 14, 13, 12, 12, 12, 10, 10, 9, 9, 9, 8, 8, 8, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 
6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 
3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2008 154 [3251, 15, 14, 14, 14, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 9, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 
6, 6, 6, 6, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 
4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2009 128 [3417, 15, 14, 14, 14, 13, 12, 11, 9, 9, 8, 8, 8, 8, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 5, 
5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 
3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2010 130 [3579, 32, 15, 14, 13, 12, 9, 9, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 
6, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 
3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2011 127 [3658, 18, 14, 14, 13, 13, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 9, 9, 9, 8, 8, 8, 8, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 6, 
6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 
4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2012 121 [3824, 14, 13, 13, 13, 12, 12, 11, 11, 11, 10, 10, 10, 10, 9, 9, 9, 9, 8, 8, 8, 8, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 
6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 
4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2013 111 [3978, 13, 13, 12, 11, 11, 10, 10, 10, 10, 9, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 
6, 6, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 
3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2014 107 [4061, 14, 13, 13, 11, 11, 10, 10, 10, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 
7, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 
4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2015 110 [4080, 13, 13, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 10, 9, 9, 9, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 6, 6, 6, 
6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 
4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2016 124 [3918, 14, 14, 13, 13, 11, 11, 10, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 
6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 
4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
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Table I.3. Summary Statistics 
  
Panel I.3A. Key Firm Variables 
 count mean sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
roa1 11,483 2.204 14.773 -4.69 0.13 2.64 5.85 10.40 
tq1 10,036 2.038 6.855 0.72 0.97 1.29 1.92 3.29 
netsales 14,490 0.099 0.454 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.14 
sgata 12,888 0.163 1.273 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.17 0.29 
leverage 14,120 3.675 0.734 2.84 3.39 3.81 4.10 4.32 
assetgrowth 8,535 2.695 1.483 0.96 1.91 2.76 3.56 4.31 
quickratio 13,891 2.152 9.247 0.41 0.71 1.13 1.93 3.57 
age 21,504 24.105 25.067 4.00 9.00 19.00 31.00 45.00 
scgi 4,949 58.272 13.578 49.04 54.86 60.22 65.45 70.19 
hhi_ta 24,208 0.233 0.185 0.06 0.11 0.19 0.28 0.44 
 
Panel I.3B. Unweighted Network Variables (Flat Projection) 
 count mean sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
Fb 17,401 0.002 0.004 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Fc 17,401 0.117 0.090 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.19 0.21 
Fd 17,401 4.556 4.751 0.00 0.00 3.00 7.00 11.00 
Fe 17,401 0.013 0.039 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 
Fbq 17,401 2.451 1.624 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.00 5.00 
Fcq 17,401 2.809 1.526 1.00 1.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
Fdq 17,401 2.707 1.506 1.00 1.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
Feq 17,401 2.811 1.526 1.00 1.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
Fnq 17,401 2.719 1.506 1.00 1.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
 
Panel I.3C. Simple Weighted Network Variables (Weighted Projection) 
 count mean sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
Wb 17,401 0.002 0.004 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Wc 17,401 0.114 0.088 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.19 0.21 
Wd 17,401 5.176 5.812 0.00 0.00 4.00 8.00 13.00 
We 17,401 0.005 0.040 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Wbq 17,401 2.531 1.618 1.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 5.00 
Wcq 17,401 2.809 1.526 1.00 1.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
Wdq 17,401 2.720 1.519 1.00 1.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
Weq 17,401 2.810 1.526 1.00 1.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
Wnq 17,401 2.724 1.501 1.00 1.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
 
Panel I.3D. Hyperbolic Weighted Network Variables (Collaboration Projection) 
 count mean sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
Cb 17,401 0.003 0.007 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Cc 17,401 0.361 0.300 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.63 0.75 
Cd 17,401 1.876 1.847 0.00 0.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
Ce 17,401 0.004 0.041 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Cbq 17,401 2.462 1.647 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.00 5.00 
Ccq 17,401 2.810 1.526 1.00 1.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
Cdq 17,401 2.497 1.511 1.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 5.00 
Ceq 17,401 2.809 1.525 1.00 1.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
Cnq 17,401 2.738 1.499 1.00 1.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
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Table I.5. Differences in Means 
  
Panel I.5A. T Tests of High and Low Centralities under Unweighted Flat Projection 
Fb High Fb Low Fb Diff. Std.Error Obs. 
roa1 2.2789 1.3705 -0.9084*** 0.2816 10527 
tq1 1.8561 2.0129 0.1568 0.1327 9488 
 
Fc High Fc Low Fc Diff. Std.Error Obs. 
roa1 2.2061 1.3523 -0.8538*** 0.2818 10527 
tq1 1.9221 1.9531 0.0310 0.1333 9488 
 
Fd High Fd Low Fd Diff. Std.Error Obs. 
roa1 2.3920 1.2175 -1.1745*** 0.2812 10527 
tq1 1.9771 1.8930 -0.0841 0.1327 9488 
 
Fe High Fe Low Fe Diff. Std.Error Obs. 
roa1 2.1069 1.4692 -0.6377** 0.2817 10527 
tq1 1.9388 1.9330 -0.0059 0.1332 9488 
* p < 0.1, ** p < .05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Panel I.5B. T Tests of High and Low Centralities under Simple Weighted Projection 
Wb High Wb Low Wb Diff. Std.Error Obs. 
roa1 2.3636 1.2634 -1.1002*** 0.2813 10527 
tq1 1.8580 2.0153 0.1573 0.1327 9488 
 
Wc High Wc Low Wc Diff. Std.Error Obs. 
roa1 2.1934 1.3672 -0.8262*** 0.2818 10527 
tq1 1.9343 1.9384 0.0041 0.1332 9488 
 
Wd High Wd Low Wd Diff. Std.Error Obs. 
roa1 2.5117 1.0939 -1.4178*** 0.2811 10527 
tq1 1.9649 1.9054 -0.0595 0.1327 9488 
 
We High We Low We Diff. Std.Error Obs. 
roa1 2.2625 1.3017 -0.9608*** 0.2816 10527 
tq1 1.9620 1.9054 -0.0566 0.1332 9488 
* p < 0.1, ** p < .05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Panel I.5C. T Tests of High and Low Centralities under Hyperbolic Collaboration Projection 
Cb High Cb Low Cb Diff. Std.Error Obs. 
roa1 2.2973 1.3383 -0.9590*** 0.2814 10527 
tq1 1.8625 2.0084 0.1459 0.1327 9488 
 
Cc High Cc Low Cc Diff. Std.Error Obs. 
roa1 2.1337 1.4366 -0.6972** 0.2818 10527 
tq1 1.9280 1.9456 0.0176 0.1330 9488 
 
Cd High Cd Low Cd Diff. Std.Error Obs. 
roa1 2.4798 1.3321 -1.1477*** 0.2857 10527 
tq1 1.9456 1.9291 -0.0165 0.1340 9488 
 
Ce High Ce Low Ce Diff. Std.Error Obs. 
roa1 2.2703 1.2884 -0.9819*** 0.2816 10527 
tq1 1.9484 1.9213 -0.0270 0.1333 9488 
* p < 0.1, ** p < .05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix for Part 2 
 
Table II.1 Variable List 
Panel II.1A Ownership Network Variables 
Abbreviation Variable Name Description and Remarks 
Ub Unity-weighted 
Betweenness  
Node Betweenness Centrality Score for Unity-
weighted 
Uc Unity-weighted 
Closeness  
Node Closeness Centrality Score for Unity-
weighted 
Ud Unity-weighted 
Degree 
Node Degree for Unity-weighted 
Ue Unity-weighted 
Eigenvector  
Node Eigenvector Centrality Score for Unity-
weighted 
Unq Unity-weighted N-
score Composite 
(Quintile) 
Quintile Composite Centrality Score for Unity-
weighted 
Ubq, Ucq, 
Udq, Ueq 
Unity-weighted 
Centrality (Quintile) 
Quintile for Betweenness, Closeness, Degree or 
Eigenvector centrality for Unity-weighted 
Graph 
   
Sb Stake-weighted 
Betweenness  
Node Betweenness Centrality Score for Stake-
weighted 
Sc Stake-weighted 
Closeness  
Node Closeness Centrality Score for Stake-
weighted 
Sd Stake-weighted 
Degree 
Node Degree for Stake-weighted 
Se Stake-weighted 
Eigenvector  
Node Eigenvector Centrality Score for Stake-
weighted 
Snq Stake-weighted N-
score Composite 
(Quintile) 
Quintile Composite Centrality Score for Stake-
weighted 
Sbq, Scq,  
Sdq, Seq 
Stake-weighted 
Centrality (Quintile) 
Quintile for Betweenness, Closeness, Degree or 
Eigenvector centrality for Stake-weighted 
Graph 
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Panel II.1B Firm Variables 
Abbreviation Variable Name Description and Remarks 
roa, roa1, 
roa2, roa3, 
roa4 
Return-on-assets Return-on-assets of the firm. The suffix, if 
present, indicates the look-ahead number of 
years. 
tq, tq1, tq2, 
tq3, tq4, tq5 
Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q of the firm. The suffix, if present, 
indicates the look-ahead number of years. 
quickratio Quick Ratio Contemporaneous quick ratio of the firm.  
netsales Net Sales Net Sales (in log) of the firm in USD.  
sgata SG&A to Assets Percentage of Selling, General and Admin 
expense over the total assets of the firm 
leverage Leverage The leverage level of the firm, defined as the 
ratio of total debt over total assets 
assetgrowth Asset Growth Asset growth rate of the firm 
age Firm Age The age of the firm since its founding. 
hhi_ta Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index 
This measures industry concentration at the 
Fama-French 30 industry portfolio based on 
total assets.   
ffi10  The Fama-French 10 Industry Portfolios, 
namely: 
1. Consumer NonDurables 
2. Consumer Durables 
3. Manufacturing 
4. Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and 
Products 
5. Business Equipment 
6. Telephone and Television 
Transmission 
7. Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 
(Laundries, Repair Shops) 
8. Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and 
Drugs 
9. Utilities 
10. Other 
scgi Singapore Corporate 
Governance Index 
Value weighted score of the firm on the 
Singapore Corporate Governance Index 
stake Stakeholdings  Percentage stakeholdings of largest ultimate 
shareholder 
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Table II.2. Ownership Network Graph Statistics
Panel II.2A. General Graph Statistics
Graph Size (Sum of all edge weights)
Year Nodes Unity-Weighted Stake-Weighted
2004 3400 9,272 1,486,092
2005 5362 13,477 2,929,515
2006 6039 15,789 3,357,875
2007 7092 19,522 3,934,515
2008 7943 21,053 4,530,633
2009 8217 21,322 4,201,324
2010 8647 22,613 4,446,758
2011 8775 22,528 4,547,808
2012 9081 23,662 4,771,725
2013 9322 24,018 4,888,937
2014 9866 24,048 5,195,111
Panel II.2B. Graph Components
Year #Components Components (Singletons omited)
2004 66 [3074, 20, 20, 18, 10, 10, 9, 8, 8, 8, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 
4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
2005 10 [5288, 18, 17, 14, 10, 4, 3, 3, 3, 2]
2006 7 [5983, 15, 13, 10, 10, 5, 3]
2007 9 [7030, 20, 13, 9, 6, 5, 5, 2, 2]
2008 7 [7896, 24, 9, 6, 3, 3, 2]
2009 8 [8179, 10, 8, 7, 5, 3, 3, 2]
2010 2 [8621, 26]
2011 5 [8739, 23, 7, 3, 3]
2012 8 [9029, 10, 10, 10, 9, 6, 4, 3]
2013 10 [9223, 22, 21, 20, 10, 7, 6, 6, 4, 3]
2014 14 [9784, 20, 10, 8, 7, 6, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 2]
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Table II.3. Summary Statistics 
  
Panel II.3A. Key Firm Variables 
 count mean sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
roa1 7,642 1.950 15.068 -4.86 -0.03 2.67 5.86 10.20 
tq1 6,706 1.813 2.772 0.68 0.94 1.26 1.86 3.13 
stake 5,983 37.418 21.045 11.51 21.63 34.97 52.33 65.91 
netsales 8,559 0.109 0.499 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.14 
sgata 8,239 0.181 1.576 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.18 0.30 
leverage 8,471 3.651 0.746 2.79 3.35 3.80 4.08 4.30 
assetgrowth 5,530 2.735 1.426 1.03 1.96 2.77 3.58 4.33 
quickratio 8,468 2.278 11.169 0.42 0.72 1.16 2.02 3.81 
age 9,910 26.025 24.573 5.00 11.00 21.00 33.00 46.00 
scgi 4,949 58.272 13.578 49.04 54.86 60.22 65.45 70.19 
hhi_ta 10,883 0.161 0.184 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.23 0.38 
 
Panel II.3B. Unity-Weighted Network Variables 
 count mean sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
Ub 6,004 0.003 0.004 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Uc 6,004 0.296 0.055 0.24 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.33 
Ud 6,004 34.364 53.067 13.00 16.00 19.00 25.00 63.00 
Ue 6,004 0.013 0.026 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 
Ubq 6,004 2.997 1.414 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
Ucq 6,004 2.997 1.414 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
Udq 6,004 2.893 1.449 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
Ueq 6,004 2.997 1.414 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
Unq 6,004 2.862 1.390 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
 
Panel II.3C. Stake-Weighted Network Statistics 
 count mean sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
Sb 6,004 75.597 147.651 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 370.37 
Sc 6,004 0.002 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sd 6,004 7335.280 3147.032 4126.00 6019.00 7459.50 8524.50 9499.00 
Se 6,004 0.006 0.031 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sbq 6,004 2.997 1.415 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
Scq 6,004 2.764 1.146 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 
Sdq 6,004 2.997 1.415 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
Seq 6,004 2.997 1.414 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
Snq 6,004 2.752 1.444 1.00 1.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
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Table II.5. Differences in Means of Ownership Centralities 
  
Panel II.5A. T Tests of High and Low (Unity-weighted) Centralities 
Ub High Ub Low Ub Diff. Std. Error Obs. 
roa1 2.0186 1.3083 -0.7103* 0.3652 5514 
tq1 1.7968 1.6040 -0.1927*** 0.0745 5052 
 
Uc High Uc Low Uc Diff. Std. Error Obs. 
roa1 1.9448 1.3650 -0.5798 0.3654 5514 
tq1 1.7980 1.5830 -0.2151*** 0.0748 5052 
 
Ud High Ud Low Ud Diff. Std. Error Obs. 
roa1 2.3763 1.0450 -1.3313*** 0.3658 5514 
tq1 1.9511 1.4571 -0.4939*** 0.0743 5052 
 
Ue High Ue Low Ue Diff. Std. Error Obs. 
roa1 2.3333 1.0021 -1.3312*** 0.3649 5514 
tq1 1.9405 1.4230 -0.5175*** 0.0744 5052 
* p < 0.1, ** p < .05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Panel II.5B. T Tests of High and Low Stake-weighted Centralities 
Sb High Sb Low Sb Diff. Std. Error Obs. 
roa1 2.6110 0.7476 -1.8634*** 0.3645 5514 
tq1 1.9184 1.4751 -0.4433*** 0.0743 5052 
 
Sc High Sc Low Sc Diff. Std. Error Obs. 
roa1 2.9064 0.4848 -2.4217*** 0.3640 5514 
tq1 2.0088 1.3608 -0.6480*** 0.0741 5052 
 
Sd High Sd Low Sd Diff. Std. Error Obs. 
roa1 2.6648 0.6540 -2.0108*** 0.3643 5514 
tq1 1.9606 1.4587 -0.5019*** 0.0743 5052 
 
Se High Se Low Se Diff. Std. Error Obs. 
roa1 1.6189 1.7083 0.0895 0.3654 5514 
tq1 1.8520 1.5353 -0.3167*** 0.0745 5052 
* p < 0.1, ** p < .05, *** p < 0.01 
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